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Abstract
In the last two decades, asset-based social policies, which encourage families,
especially low-income families, to accumulate assets by providing appropriate
institutional settings, have received increasing attention from policymakers and
researchers. Various programs and strategies have been outlined to improve saving
and asset ownership opportunities in disadvantaged populations. Although there are
multiple proposals of asset-based programs for children with disabilities, few of them
have been implemented.
To better inform asset-based policy practices for children with disabilities, this
study examines asset effects for this population using the secondary survey data.
Asset effects refer to the hypothesized positive influences of household assets on child
development. A sample of children with disabilities is created from the Child
Development Supplement of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID-CDS). This
study has two specific aims: (1) To examine the relationship between household
assets and children’s educational and health outcomes; and (2) To examine the
mechanism of asset effects on children’s educational and health outcomes.
From the life course perspective, the dissertation hypothesizes that household
assets have cumulative effects on child development. Child well-being is a function of
not only current household assets but also all previous household assets invested in
the child. I propose four empirical strategies to test the hypothesis of asset effects for
children with disabilities. The first set of analyses focuses on household assets
measured before childbirth. The second strategy uses propensity score classification,
which categorizes children into multiple groups based on households’ expected asset
values. The third set of analyses applies the fixed-effects model to control for timeinvariant unobserved factors. The final analyses test the hypothesis of asset effects in
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a dynamic model using Structural Equations Modeling (SEM).
The study finds that household assets have positive associations with child
outcomes for children with disabilities, especially with health outcomes. Positive
associations are more likely to be seen when household net worth is greater than
$40,000 or liquid assets are greater than $10,000. Although the findings suggest that
household assets in early childhood are more important for child well-being than
household assets at a later stage, positive associations exist in both periods. The
findings indicate the importance of having assets for the entire childhood. The study
also shows that marginal effects of household assets are greater for low-income and
low-wealth households.
Findings of this study have important policy implications. Asset building
should be included in the new vision of successful development for children with
disabilities. For families raising children with disabilities, asset accumulation should
start early and last long with a specific focus on health and health services. The
minimum savings goal should be set at around $10,000. Asset-based programs for
children with disabilities should be progressive toward low-income and low-wealth
populations.
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Chapter 1: Specific Aims
This dissertation aims to test the associations between household assets
(wealth) and child outcomes for children with disabilities, and to explore how
household assets affect child development. It is a study of transformation of
household financial capital to children’s human capital and health capital. The
research questions are defined mainly by the focal independent variable—household
assets. Findings of this study provide an empirical justification for the development of
asset-based social policies, especially for the population of children with disabilities.
Asset-based social policies (e.g., Individual Development Account [IDAs] and
Child Development Accounts [CDAs]) encourage families, including disadvantaged
families, to accumulate assets by providing appropriate institutional settings and
financial incentives (Blank & Barr, 2009; McKernan & Sherraden, 2008; Prabhakar,
2008; Regan, 2001;Regan & Paxton, 2001; Retsinas & Belsky, 2005; Schreiner &
Sherraden, 2007; Sherraden, 2005; Sherraden & McBride, 2010). Initially suggested
by Sherraden (1988, 1991), asset accumulation is becoming a new paradigm to guide
policy efforts in helping people find a path out of poverty and achieve economic
security. Various programs and strategies have been outlined to improve opportunities
of saving and asset ownership in disadvantaged populations (Cramer et al., 2010;
Cramer, O’Brien, & Lopez-Fernandini, 2008).
At present, practices of asset-based programs for children are mainly based on
theoretical discussions of asset effects for children. The hypothesis of asset effects
suggests that asset accumulation can lead to positive economic, psychological and
social outcomes for families and family members (Sherraden, 1991; Shanks, Kim,
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Loke, & Destin, 2009). 1 For example, household assets indicate economic protection.
Children in wealthy households are well protected from economic hardship, have
better access to education, and gain better educational and health outcomes. In the
long run, household assets also contribute to a child’s social mobility and generate
positive psychosocial effects on a child’s self-efficacy, future orientation, and civil
engagement.
However, few studies empirically test the hypothesis of asset effects for
children, which presents a challenge to the development of asset-based policies. To
better inform practice and policy, this study uses longitudinal data from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to examine asset effects for a specific
population—children with disabilities. The study has two aims:
Aim 1: To examine the relationship between household assets and
educational and health outcomes for children with disabilities.
Aim 2: To examine whether asset effects on educational and health outcomes
for children with disabilities are mediated through parenting behaviors.
Focusing on children with disabilities, the current study is motivated by
several policy developments for children with disabilities. As a disadvantaged group,
these children can benefit substantially from asset-based policies that match their
development goals. For instance, the Social Security Administration is planning to
develop Individual Development Accounts for youth with disabilities in Miami (SSA
Office of Program Development & Research, 2008). A bill for the Disability Savings
Act was proposed in the Senate in 2008 to use tax-advantaged savings tools to
encourage individuals with disabilities and their families to save private funds for
disability-related expenses, including education, medical services, employment

1 The study uses the term asset effects hereafter to refer to this hypothesis.
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training and support, transportation, and other related services. In addition, the
National Council of Disability (NCD) has proposed asset-based policies for youth
with disabilities in its annual national disability policy progress reports (NCD, 2004,
2005, 2006, & 2007).
Another consideration of studying children with disabilities is that asset effects
may vary by child characteristics. Childhood disability may create greater needs for
economic resources for quality care, health services, and parents’ non-working time.
In other words, the marginal effect of household assets for children with disabilities
may be different from that for children without disabilities.
This study contributes to the knowledge base in several ways. It examines
asset effects on a specific population (i.e., children with disabilities), and extends
current research to include health status (in addition to education) as a child outcome.
This study also discusses several important questions related to the development of
asset-based policies, including what amount of assets is needed to generate asset
effects, which population benefits more from asset accumulation, and what empirical
strategy is better to test the hypothesis of asset effects.
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Chapter 2: Background

The research question regarding asset effects for children (and children with
disabilities) is important for the development of asset-based policy. The conceptual
discussion regarding this question is extensive (see Lerman & McKernan, 2008), and
it relates to the research, originated in the late 1960s and early 1970s, on the
association between child well-being and family background (Duncan, Featherman, &
Duncan 1972; Hogan, 1981; Marini 1978). Asset effects for children with disabilities
can be examined from a number of theoretical perspectives, including the theory of
asset-based welfare (Sherraden, 1991), disability models (Bickenbach, 1992;
Bickenbach, Chatterji, Badley & Üstün, 1999; Oliver, 1990), and theories regarding
family backgrounds and child development (Conger & Donnellan, 2007). However
different they are, there seems more consistency than controversy in their respective
theoretical predictions of asset effects.
Assets are rights or claims related to tangible or intangible property, including
(1) money savings; (2) stocks, bonds, and other financial securities; (3) real property;
(4) hard assets, such as automobiles, jewelry, art, and collectibles; (5) machines,
equipment, tools, and other tangible components of productions; (6) durable
household goods; (7) natural resources; and (8) copyrights, patents, and other
intellectual property (Nam, Huang, & Sherraden, 2008; Sherraden, 1991). In general,
households with assets perform better than those without in multiple family functions.
The process of accumulating household assets not only changes parenting behaviors,
parental characteristics, and home environment, but it also provides a supportive
family context for child development. Children living in households with assets have
better economic, social, and psychological well-being (Sherraden, 1991). More
specifically, assets effects are achieved through the use of assets (asset spending) as
4

well as the ownership of assets (asset holding) (Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007). Table
2.1 lists possible asset effects.
TABLE 2.1 ABOUT HERE

2.1 Asset Effects on Economic Security
Household assets can be used to meet children’s basic needs and protect them
from economic hardship, such as food insecurity and homelessness (Haveman &
Wolfe, 1995; Lerman & McKernan; 2008; Sherraden, 1991). Such effects on
consumption smoothing and economic well-being are often examined in conjunction
with negative income shocks and economic crises. Severe economic hardship can lead
to dysfunctional families and negative outcomes for both parents and children.
Economic hardship and pressures increase the risk of emotional distress, behavioral
problems, and marital conflicts (Conger & Donnellan, 2007), all of which may impair
parental nurturance and involvement in child development. Assets in a family then
provide a “firewall” against economic hardship and economic pressures. For those
with sufficient household assets, negative financial events (such as job loss) may not
necessarily translate into hardship or generate massive economic pressures. Therefore,
household assets are negatively associated with economic hardship and pressures. To
use assets for consumption smoothing allows families to maintain their
socioeconomic status and avoid social and psychological problems (e.g., depression,
marital breakup, child and spouse abuse, alcohol and drug use, and so on) (Lerman &
McKernan, 2008).
Using assets for consumption smoothing presents an effect of asset spending.
Asset effects on household economic security, however, are not limited to asset
spending. Asset holding itself may have positive effects on household economic
security as well (Schreiner& Sherraden, 2006). The process of accumulating assets is
5

a sign of planning for the future, which in turn may reduce the risk of experiencing
negative income shocks.
Asset effects on economic security are especially important for families that
have children with disabilities. In many cases, having a child with a disability impairs
a family’s earning capacity (Seligman & Darling, 2007) because parents (usually
mothers) have to reduce their labor force participation and spend more time on child
care (Breslau, 1983). It is perhaps not surprising that a large proportion of families
raising children with disabilities live in poverty (Wang, 2005). These families are
vulnerable to income fluctuation and have greater need of financial backup.
2.2 Asset Effects on Access to Services and Support
Household assets can be used to purchase services, such as medical treatment,
rehabilitation, assistive technology, long-term care, and other health services, in
desired quantity and quality for children with disabilities (WHO, 2001). Children with
disabilities may require health-related services beyond the need of children without
disabilities (Newacheck et al., 2009). Depending on the type of disability and the
health condition, children may need a wide array of physicians and specialty care
providers, and they are among the most vulnerable of all populations to any limitation
or disruption in health services (Kogan, et al., 2009; Mithchell & Gaskin, 2004). For
example, children with disabilities have greater need of respite care, babysitting and
medical care (Darling, 1987). The biggest differences in health service utilization
between children with and without disabilities are hospital days (464 vs. 55 days per
1000 children) and home health care (Newacheck, Inkelas, & Kim, 2004).
Services for children with disabilities are expensive. The need for specific
medical care and frequent use of medically related services, such as physical,
occupational, and language therapy, also contribute to the higher cost of health care.
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Previous research has identified physical and occupational therapy, physician visits,
and hospitalizations as the largest out-of-pocket expenses for families raising children
with disabilities (Darling, 1987; Lukemeyer, Meyers, & Smeeding, 2000). Some
children may need special equipment and supplies for daily living, which could be
expensive as well. Other costs may be incurred as a result of housing and vehicle
modifications. All of these add to a family’s financial burden. The average direct outof-pocket expenditure for families of children with disabilities is more than twice that
for other families. According to Kuhlthau et al (2005), four out of every ten families
caring for children with disabilities report financial concerns.
The literature also shows a higher level of unmet needs among children with
disabilities (Mithchell & Gaskin, 2004). More than 30% of children with special
health care needs are classified as underinsured, due to a lack of adequate primary and
preventive services, uneven access to subspecialty care and specialized therapies, poor
service coordination, and barriers to other direct services (Kogan, Newacheck,
Honberg, & Strickland, 2005; Perrin, 2002). About 10-20% of children with
disabilities do not receive specialty care, therapy services, home health services, and
mental health services as needed (Mithchell & Gaskin, 2004). Studies consistently
find that underinsured children with disabilities are overrepresented in low-income
families, and their families have more financial problems and difficulty in obtaining
specialty referrals (Davidoff, 2004; Parish, Shattuck, & Rose, 2009).
Given the high unmet needs and high costs of health services, household
assets are a key determinant of health care for children with disabilities, in addition to
various possible sources of support (Korpela, Siirtola, Koivikko, 1992; Parish et al.,
2009; Perrin, 2002; Shattuck & Parish, 2008). The existence of the public health
services provided by the government (such as Medicaid, Medicare, and State
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Children’s Health Insurance Program) is not likely to diminish the importance of
household economic resources because health services provided by the public health
system may be inadequate and therefore necessitate families’ pursuit of health
services from other sources.
Household economic resources can have a unique role in healthcare even for
families covered by health insurance. With employment-based private insurance,
families raising children with disabilities typically have higher total expenditures and
out-of-pocket expenditures than those covered by public insurance (Honberg et al.,
2009; Kogan et al., 2009; Newacheck et al., 2000). As the cost of employment-based
health insurance is increasingly shifted toward employees (Kogan et al., 2009), family
economic resources have become more important than ever. Undoubtedly, household
assets also provide necessary protection when families lose their insurance coverage.
In the face of job loss and ineligibility for public insurance, families may spend down
their savings to purchase commercial health insurance (Kogan et al., 2009).
2.3 Asset Effects on Family Investment in Child Development
Households with assets have financial resources to invest in children’s human
capital, improve their life chances (Mayer, 1997), and provide a ladder for social
mobility (Conley, 2001; Shapiro, 2004). This idea is rooted in the belief that the more
families invest in children the more likely they will succeed in the future.
Assets are connected, in a number of ways, to family investment in children.
One such investment is health services discussed above. Another important
investment is children’s academic and cognitive development (Conley, 2001; Nam &
Huang, 2009; Orr, 2003; Yeung & Conley, 2008; Zhan, 2006; Zhan & Sherraden,
2003). Compared to those of wealthy families, low-wealth children often live in
physical environments offering less stimulation and fewer resources (e.g., educational
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toys and books) for learning. In contrast, wealthy families are more likely to provide
opportunities for children to receive high-quality education, and even pay for their
post-secondary education. Second, home equity is generally the most important asset
in a family, and home ownership indicates not only a family’s standard of living but
also its school and neighborhood environments. Wealthy families can choose a home
located in a good neighborhood and school district. Last but not least important,
families with assets are more likely to have high expectations for children and be
more willing to invest in child investment.
Household assets are found to be positively related to children’s academic
performance, measured by standardized test scores or grades controlling for a range of
covariates (such as household characteristics, parental characteristics, parenting
behaviors, and children’s characteristics) (Orr, 2003; Shanks, 2007; Zhan, 2006; Zhan
& Sherraden, 2003). But the magnitude of asset effects varies. For example,
children’s math scores increase by .29, .34, 1.01, and 1.57 units, respectively, as a
result of doubling household net worth as reported in Elliott (2008), Orr (2003),
Yeung and Conley (2008), and Zhan (2006).
Household assets also have indirect effects on children’s academic
performance through parenting behaviors and home environment. Orr (2003)
indicates that asset effects decrease by 15% when parenting variables and home
environment are included in analyses (e.g., educational resources in home and
parental involvement). When a mother’s expectation for a child’s educational
attainment is included, the grade difference between children of homeowners and
renters decreases by nearly 40% (Zhan & Sherraden, 2003). As both home ownership
and the mother’s savings are positively related to the mother’s expectations, the
results suggest that asset effects are partially mediated by mother’s expectations
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(Zhan & Sherraden, 2003; Zhan, 2006).
In addition to academic performance, household assets are positively related to
children’s school and educational attainment, including total schooling years (Conley,
2001; Nam & Huang, 2009), high school graduation (Zhan & Sherraden, 2003),
college attendance (Conley, 2001; Nam & Huang, 2009), college graduation (Zhan &
Sherraden, 2010), and the number of post-high school years (Conley, 2001). When
household net worth is doubled, the total number of schooling years increases by
about a year (Conley, 2001; Nam & Huang, 2009). Zhan and Sherraden (2003)
indicate that children whose mothers have savings higher than $3,000 have the odds
of high school graduation 1.3 times greater than those whose mothers have no savings.
In addition, when parental net worth increases by 100%, the probability of college
attendance increases by 8.3% (Conley, 2001).
2.4 Asset Effects on Psychological Well-being
Asset holding can shape positive psychological well-being (Schreiner &
Sherraden, 2007; Sherraden, 1991). People with assets tend to be oriented toward
long-term goals and plan for the future. Life chances on the basis of accumulated
assets can be internalized into the cognitive structure of individuals, particularly
during early stages of the life cycle. Children from families owning assets are more
likely to develop future orientation, self-esteem, and self-efficacy, which are of great
importance for children with disabilities (Goodley & Lawthom, 2006). Previous
studies find a connection between household assets and children’s educational
expectation and aspiration (e.g., Zhan & Sherraden, 2003). Families holding assets
often convey high expectations for children, help children shape the behaviors needed
to achieve educational goals, and even present themselves as role models for children
to emulate (Shanks et al., 2009; Davis-Kean, 2005; Goyette & Xie, 1999; Singh et. al,
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1995).
Asset spending can also create positive psychological well-being. During
economic hard times, owning assets for consumption smoothing not only ensures the
level of consumption, but also creates a sense of control, safety, and greater life
satisfaction (Sherraden, 1991).
2.5 Supportive Family Context and Conceptual Model
The above mentioned asset effects on family functioning for children with
disabilities and their families are proposed as indirect effects through parenting
behaviors, parent-child interaction, and home environment, because children
generally do not have direct control over household economic resources. Similar to
the mediation mechanism suggested by previous studies (e.g., Berger, Paxson, &
Waldfogel, 2009), holding assets may bring changes in parents’ behaviors and home
environment, which eventually translates into better family functioning (in economic
support, health care, recreation, socialization, self-identity, affection, and education)
that influence child development (Marshak, Seligman, & Prezant, 1999). If we see
home environment, parental characteristics, and family functioning altogether as
family context, then it is by providing a supportive family context that household
assets exert effects on children.
FIGURE 2.1 ABOUT HERE

Figure 2.1 describes the mediation mechanism linking household assets and
child well-being. According to the life course theory and studies of household income
and child well-being (e.g., Berger et al., 2009; Mortimer & Shanahan, 2006), parental
characteristics broadly include socioeconomic characteristics, parental attitudes,
parenting behaviors, and parent-child interaction. Home environment is defined as the
physical environment. Child well-being may include but is not limited to economic
11

well-being, health status, cognitive development and educational achievement.
It seems reasonable to suggest that household assets have effects for children
with disabilities similar to those for children without disabilities, since psychological
studies already show the importance of a supportive family context for children with
disabilities (Lewis, 2003). For families raising children with disabilities, there may be
unique challenges and negative experiences related to child disability, such as
financial strain, parenting stress, and parental mental illness. In turn, these problems
become environmental barriers for child development. It is not clear if there is any
interaction between asset effects and these negative experiences related to child
disability. But as expected, parents of a child with a disability may relocate family
resources by investing more in child’s health care than other domains of child
development. Also, child disability may influence (increase or decrease) parents’
willingness to invest in child development, given the uncertainty of investment return.
Figure 2.2 depicts possible linkages from household assets to child well-being, with a
consideration of child disability. Child disability may also influence family economic
resources, family context, parenting behaviors (e.g., educational expectation), and
child well-being.
FIGURE 2.2 ABOUT HERE

2.6 Summary
To sum up, there is a positive relationship between assets and many measures
of child well-being. Parents with assets have more economic resources to invest in
child development and to purchase services, and they have more control over their life
style and family relations. Asset holding adds to their coping ability in dealing with
disability-related challenges and stress, and it also increases family stability. Asset
holding can shape parenting behaviors and improve the well-being of children with
12

disabilities. This study will first test the associations between household assets and
educational and health outcomes of children with disabilities in reduced-form models
controlling for household demographics and socioeconomic characteristics; it will
further test the hypothesized mediation mechanism from household assets to parenting
behaviors and then to child well-being. It is hypothesized that, (1) for children with
disabilities, household assets have positive effects on academic achievement, school
attainment, health service access, and global health status; and (2) the mechanism of
asset effects for children is that household assets affect children though parenting
behaviors, such as parental involvement in child development and parental warmth.
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Chapter 3: Data and Measure
3.1 Data Overview
Data for the study are from the Child Development Supplement (CDS) in the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID is a longitudinal survey that is
publicly available through the Institute for Social Research at the University of
Michigan (ISP, 2009). The PSID collects demographic information and
socioeconomic characteristics from a nationally representative sample of individuals
and their families annually from 1968-1997 and biennially thereafter.
Beginning in 1997, the PSID researchers supplemented its core data with
additional information from a group of children 0-12 years old (N=3,563) and their
parents from 2,380 families in the Child Development Supplement (CDS). The same
children were interviewed in 1997, 2002, and 2007, respectively, if they were still
younger than age 18 at the time of each interview. After age 18, the child exits the
CDS, and enters another PSID supplement, Transition into Adulthood (TA), which
has been conducted twice (2005 and 2007). Figure 3.1 shows the connection between
the CDS and the TA. 2 The actual sample size of each wave is listed in the figure.
FIGURE 3.1 ABOUT HERE

The CDS includes measures of a broad array of child developmental outcomes,
such as physical health and disability, emotional well-being, cognitive and academic
achievement, and social relationships with family and peers (ISP, 2009). The CDS
data are collected from multiple individuals using varied methodology. There are
several modules in the CDS: (1) the primary caregiver interview, (2) the child
interview (for those aged 10 and older), (3) the standardized educational achievement

2 This study does not use the information in the PSID-TA.
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assessment, (4) time diary of child activities, and (5) the other caregiver questionnaire.
A combination of the CDS and the PSID family data can be used to examine the
association between household assets and developmental outcomes for children with
disabilities.
The PSID main files and the CDS supplemental files contain major variables
of interest, including household assets, child disability, and child’s educational and
health outcomes. Household assets have been measured in 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999,
and biennially thereafter. Detailed information regarding these measures is provided
in the measurement section below, and the interview years of these measures are
provided in Table 3.1. In addition, the repeated measures in the PSID-CDS are
preferred over cross-sectional data. Taking advantage of the longitudinal information
provided by the PSID-CDS, this study can choose with flexibility the appropriate
measures and samples to investigate the questions of interest.
TABLE 3.1 ABOUT HERE

The PSID-CDS, however, has several limitations to the questions of interest.
First, its sample size is relatively small (3,563 in Wave I; 2,907 in Wave II; and 1,506
in Wave III). When the sample is limited to children with disabilities, it becomes even
smaller. Second, measures of major variables are not included in every wave of the
PSID (see Table 3.1). In addition, the three CDS waves with long intervals in between
(five years) are not sufficient to show developmental trajectories of the CDS children.
While some of these limitations can be addressed by alternative data sources, such as
the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) or the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth 79 Children (NLSY’79) (both of which have greater sample sizes),
these alternative data have their own disadvantages. For example, the SIPP does not
have all major variables of the study in each wave and is limited by its short panels
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(2.5-4 years) for each sample. The short panel restricts a long-term examination of
asset effects. While the NLSY’79 includes major variables in most of its interviews,
its asset measures have relatively lower response rates than those in the PSID.
Comparatively, the PSID produces more reliable asset measures because of the way
its asset questions are set up (Yeung and Conley, 2008). It would be desirable to test
asset effects using all three datasets discussed above. The two alternative data sources
are left for future examination.
3.2 Sample Selection
The study sample includes only the CDS children with disabilities. Child
disability measures are indicated by health conditions recorded in the CDS, and the
measure of child disability will be discussed in greater detail in the measurement
section. Several criteria in addition to child disability are utilized for sample selection.
The study includes the CDS children with disabilities who are (1) white or black; (2)
living in households headed by American citizens; and (3) living with at least one
biological parent when reporting disability. The study includes only white or black
children because of the small sample sizes for other racial or ethnic groups. For
example, in the CDS-I, there are only seven children with disabilities identified as
other ethnic groups. For the same reason, immigrants are excluded from the study
sample. There are 52 children living in households headed by immigrants in the CDSI. Based on these sample selection criteria, the sample includes a total of 1,065
children with disabilities in at least one of the CDS waves: 518 children in Wave I,
563 in Wave II, and 389 in Wave III.
3.3 Measures
3.3.1 Child Disability
The CDS asks primary caregivers to report child’s health and mental health,
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including a series of chronic health conditions (such as epilepsy or convulsions,
speech impairment, and so on). The same list of chronic conditions can be found in
other major child surveys, such as the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979
Cohort-Children (NLSY79 Children) and the National Longitudinal Study of
Adolescence Health (ADD Health). According to the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA 2004), 3 there are 14 specific primary conditions under the lead
definition of “child with a disability.” Ten of these primary conditions are recorded in
the CDS. Therefore, a CDS child who has a positive response on any of these
conditions is considered a child with a disability and is included in the study sample. 4
To combine different types of health conditions under a unified measure of
child disability, however, raises a concern because different types of disability may
indicate different development trajectories and outcomes. To address this issue, the
study uses dichotomous indicators of these health conditions as control variables.
3.3.2 Educational and Health Outcomes
Pollard and Lee (2003) provide a unified definition of child well-being as “a
multidimensional construct incorporating mental/psychological, physical, and social
dimensions” (p.64). This definition includes five operationalized domains: physical,
psychological, cognitive, social, and economic. The focus of this study—educational
and health outcomes—covers both physical and cognitive domains.
3 Child with a disability means a child evaluated in accordance with §§300.304
through 300.311 of IDEA as having mental retardation, a hearing impairment
(including deafness), a speech or language impairment, a visual impairment
(including blindness), a serious emotional disturbance (referred to in this part as
“emotional disturbance”), an orthopedic impairment, autism, traumatic brain injury,
other health impairment, a specific learning disability, deaf-blindness, or multiple
disabilities, and who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related services.
(IDEA, § 300.8)
4 These conditions in the CDS are epilepsy, speech impairment, hearing difficulty,
difficulty seeing, retardation, emotional disturbance, orthopedic impairment,
developmental delay, learning disability, autism, and hyperactivity.
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The CDS includes a series of indicators of educational achievement of
children. The study uses four educational outcomes: Two subsets of the WoodcockJohnson Revised Tests of Achievement (WJ-R), repeated grade, and school
suspension or expulsion in childhood. The WJ-R is a well-established and respected
measure with information on several dimensions of intellectual ability, including
degree of mastery in mathematics and reading (Woodcock & Mather, 1990). Two
subsets of the WJ-R (the Applied Problem test and the Broad Reading test) are
administered in all three waves of the CDS for children aged three years and older and
are considered measures of math and reading achievement (academic achievement).
The standardized scales of these two tests range from 0-200. The CDS also reveals
whether a child has ever repeated a grade (Yes=1/No=0) since kindergarten and
whether a child has ever been suspended or expelled from school (Yes=1/No=0).
The outcome measures regarding health status and service utilization in
childhood include the global health status (a Likert scale variable from Excellent to
Poor reported by primary caregivers), the number of school days missed due to
physical illness (a count variable), the frequency of hospitalization in the last five
years (a count variable), the number of doctor visits for physical illness last year (a
count variable), and visiting a doctor for emotional problems or not (Yes=1/No=0).
The variable of global health status, a commonly used health measure, is recoded into
a dichotomous one (Excellent=1/Otherwise=0) in all analyses. In some analyses, the
count variables are recoded as dichotomous measures (Frequency greater than
0=1/Otherwise=0).
3.3.3 Asset Measures
Two continuous asset measures—household net worth and liquid assets—are
created and used as the focal measures of household assets. The wealth modules in the

18

PSID family files (see Table 3.1) collect information on multiple household asset
types, including (1) home, (2) business/farm, (3) other real estate, (4) vehicles, (5)
checking/savings, (6) stocks and mutual funds, (7) other savings, and (8) unsecured
debts. However, it is not feasible to examine all of these asset types in the study.
Household net worth is the sum of all of these asset types net of all debts. It indicates
economic resources available to households if they sell all these assets, and it reveals
a household’s net economic position. Liquid assets are the sum of checking/savings,
stocks and mutual funds, and other savings; it is relatively easy to convert liquid
assets into cash. Previous studies have shown that liquid assets are more likely to
affect child outcomes (Conley, 2001; Nam & Huang, 2009).
Following the convention in the literature to address skewness and to obtain a
semi-elasticity explanation (Conley, 2001; Nam & Huang, 2009; Orr, 2003), the
logarithm of net worth and liquid assets are created for regression analyses. Zero
liquid asset values and zero/negative net worth values are recoded as 1 prior to the
transformation. In addition, to capture the nonlinear effects of household assets, a
four-level categorical variable is created for net worth (<$0, $0-10,000, $10,00140,000, and >$40,000). These thresholds are chosen for two reasons. First, they are
very close to the quartiles of the net worth distribution in the sample but easier to
remember than the exact quartile numbers (which can be helpful in result
interpretation). The three quartiles of net worth in the sample are $50, $9,400, and
$39,000, respectively. Results of analyses using this categorical net worth measure do
not differ from those using the quartiles. Second, negative net worth values are
categorized into one group since negative net worth may have effects on child
outcomes different from other groups (Nam & Huang, 2009). A four-level categorical
variable for liquid assets is also created using the thresholds close to the exact quartile

19

values of liquid assets ($0, $1-1,000, $1,001-10,000, and >$10,000). 5
3.3.4 Other Measures
TABLE 3.2 ABOUT HERE

The study includes four groups of control variables (see Table 3.2). The first
group is child’s characteristics, including age, gender (Male=1/Female=0), race
(Black=1/White=0), disability types, timing of reporting disability (Wave I, II, or III),
special education (Yes=1/No=0), and health insurance coverage (No insurance=0,
Employer provided=1, and Government provided=2). 6 The second group includes
indicators of household header’s characteristics, such as gender and employment
(Employed=1/Otherwise=0). The analyses also include mother’s characteristics, such
as age, education (Less than high school=0, High school=1, Some college=2, and
Four-year college and above=3), and marital status (Married=1/Otherwise=0). Third,
household characteristics are indicated by household size, number of children,
average household income in previous five years (logarithm), and public program
participation (AFDC/TANF, Food Stamp, and Supplemental Security Income).
The fourth group includes four parenting behaviors that are proposed
mediators in the study. Parental involvement is indicated by a composite scale created
by the PSID to measure parents’ cognitive stimulation and emotional support for child
development. Examples of survey questions on this scale are how many books child

5 I used different measures of net worth and liquid assets for sensitivity tests. For
example, different thresholds for categorical asset measures are tested. In one
sensitivity test, I include both categorical and continuous net worth measures as
independent variables: The continuous measure is log-transformed net worth value,
and the categorical measure indicates whether households have negative, zero, or
positive net worth.
6 Eight children with private insurance are included in the category of employerprovided insurance.
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has and how often child eats with mother and father. Items on this scale vary in the
three waves of the CDS; therefore, the range of parental involvement also varies. For
example, in the CDS-I, the value of parental involvement ranges from 7 to 27, with
higher scores indicating more involvement. Two indicators of the quality of parenting
are parenting stress and parental warmth. Parenting stress is measured by a seven-item
index indicating the primary caregiver’s feelings and perceptions about caring for the
child (e.g., “There are some things that (child) does that really bother me a lot.”). The
six-item parental warmth scale measures the warmth of the relationship between the
child and parent in the month prior to the interview, including the frequency of
showing physical affection, emotional support, and appreciation, and playing with the
child or participating in the child’s favorite activities. Developed by Child Trends, Inc.
(Hofferth, Davis-Kean, Davis, Finkelstein, 1998), both scales range from 1 to 5, with
a higher score indicating a greater degree of the measured constructs (stress and
warmth). In addition, this study includes a three-level measure of parents’ educational
expectations for children (High school or below=1, Some college=2, and Four year
college or above=3).
3.4 Missing Data
Missing data in a longitudinal survey can be a complicated issue. In the case
of the PSID-CDS, missing data result from long-term attrition, changes in interview
eligibility, imputation procedures already applied by the PSID, 7 and the data frame
defined by each specific study. The PSID-CDS user’s guide suggests using
appropriate sampling weight or multiple imputation methods to deal with the missing
7 PSID imputes missing values on wealth variables. Among all interviewed families,
there are 307 cases (4.4%) in the 1999 family data and 347 cases (4.7%) in the 2001
family data receiving imputation on wealth variables. PSID imputes these missing
values using inflation-adjusted wealth values in previous waves of PSID first. If
previous values are not available, a mean wealth value after categorizing by family
income and age of head in the group is used for imputation.
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data (ISR, 2009). This study uses a multiple imputation (MI) procedure to deal with
missing data. The MI is a repeated imputation approach that creates a small number of
copies of the data, and each copy has missing values imputed. Each copy of the data is
analyzed by standard statistical methods, and the results are combined to produce
estimates and confidence interval (Rubin, 1987). MI procedure in this study is based
on an iterative multivariate regression technique (Royston, 2004, 2005a, & 2005b),
and ten simulated datasets (or imputed datasets) are created.8

8 Twenty imputed datasets are used for sensitivity tests.
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Chapter 4: Empirical Strategies
4.1 Cumulative Effects of Household Assets
The hypothesis of asset effects for children with disabilities can be expressed
in a population model of Equation 4.1:

Yt = F ( A0 , A1, A2 ...... At , O) (4.1)
Where t indicates a child’s age, Y indicates a child outcome measure, A is
household assets, and O is other factors affecting child well-being (such as genetic
inheritance, child characteristics, disability status, home environment, parental
characteristics, social support, neighbor and school environment, policy context, and
so on). In a word, child outcome at age t is a function of not only current household
assets (At), but also all previous household assets from A0 to At. 9 It is reasonable to
hypothesize that current child outcome is a cumulative effect of all previous
investments, indicated by household assets at different ages of a child from A0 to At.
It is still not clear what the specific functional form (F()) in Equation 4.1 is.
The theoretical development of asset effects for children is not sophisticated enough
to specify this functional form. For simplicity, suppose F() is a linear and additive
function on regression coefficients:

Yt = β0 A0 + β1 A1 + β 2 A2 + ......βt At + Otγ t + μt (4.2)
β , a scalar, is a regression coefficient of assets at a certain age (i.e., β t for age t);

γ t is a N×1 matrix if Ot includes N factors; and μt is the error term in the model.
Since the PSID-CDS children are observed three times in the data, Equation 4.2 can
be further specified for the three observation periods (4.3):

9 Theoretically, future assets may affect current child outcome as well. For example,
by knowing that their families have sufficient financial resources for future college
costs, children may have desirable educational outcomes.
23

Yt = β 0 A0 + β1 A1 + β 2 A2 + ...... + βt At + Ot γ t + μt
Yt +1 = β ′0 A0 + β ′1 A1 + β ′2 A2 + ...... + β ′t At + β ′t +1 At +1 + Ot +1γ t′+1 + μt +1
Yt + 2 = β ′′0 A0 + β ′′1 A1 + β ′′2 A2 + ...... + β ′′t At + β ′′t +1 At +1 + β ′′t + 2 At + 2 + Ot + 2γ ′′t + 2 + μt + 2

The model of Yt +1 includes one more predictor ( At +1 ) than the model of Yt , and,
similarly, the model of Yt + 2 adds another predictor ( At + 2 ) based on the model of Yt +1 .
Since household assets have a hypothetically positive relationship with child
outcomes, the mean of regression coefficients of asset measures in each model
( β , β ′, and β ′′ ), or the average effects of previous household assets on current child
outcome, is likely to be greater than 0. Each individual coefficient ( β , β ′ and β ′′ ),
however, is not necessarily greater than 0.
There are several possibilities regarding the pattern from β 0 to β t in the
model of Yt . One possibility is that the closer the times household assets and child
outcome are observed, the bigger the regression coefficients of asset measures are
( β m < β n , if m < n ≤ t ). In other words, current assets are considered more important
than earlier assets for current outcome measures. If this is the pattern, it seems
reasonable to say that β ′′t < β ′t < β t across three models of Yt+2, Yt+1, and Yt . A
specific example of this pattern may be the relationships among household assets,
household liquidity constraints, and children’s college entry: Household assets
measured closer to children’s college entry are more important than those measured in
an earlier stage regarding children’s college entry.
The second possible pattern is the opposite, in which household assets in early
childhood are more important than later assets for child development
( β m > β n , if m < n ≤ t ). Studies by Heckman and his colleagues (e.g., Cunha &
Heckman, 2010) suggest that family investment in early childhood is more efficient
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than that in late childhood. The third possibility is that for specific outcome measures,
household assets have expected positive effects only in certain age ranges
( β t > 0, if m < t < n ). These age ranges are key stages for particular development
goals. The third pattern seems consistent with theoretical discussions of child growth
and development stages. Finally, the fourth possibility is that asset effects at different
ages are similar ( β 0 ≈ β1 ≈ β 2 ...... ≈ βt ). Nonetheless, the pattern from β 0 to β t may
vary by child outcome measures, and different patterns have variant policy
implications.
4.2 Four Empirical Strategies
To test asset effects for children with disabilities, all factors specified in O of
Equation 4.2 (e.g., genetic inheritance, child characteristics, disability status, home
environment, parental characteristics, social support, neighbor and school
environment, policy context, and so on) should be controlled for in the model,
especially those affecting both household asset accumulation and child outcomes. If at
all possible, an experiment with randomly assigned assets would be the best option to
control for these factors. Unfortunately, this is not possible for the current study for
which the observed secondary data are used. Therefore, I include some of these
factors as control variables in regression analyses, a conventional practice in the
literature. Four groups of control variables are proposed in Chapter 3 (see Table 3.2).
The strategy of adding control variables is robust in general, but not without
limitations. First, factors correlated with household assets and child outcomes, if not
observed or measured in the data, can by no means be controlled for. This is the socalled “omitted variable bias.” For example, children’s genetic inheritance, parents’
saving taste and financial capability, and parents’ future orientation may affect both
household assets and child outcomes, but they are not measured in the PSID-CDS. In
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addition, as the theory in this area is far from adequately developed, some factors
important for both household assets and child outcomes yet not defined are likely not
to be included in analyses. Second, the strategy of controlling variables works well
under the assumption that the confoundedness between household assets and control
variables is correctly specified and the sample data on control variables are balanced
by the level of the focal independent variable. Failure to meet these assumptions
would create the problem of estimation bias. For example, to simply add variables,
such as household income and household head’s education and employment, as
control variables in the model may cause misspecification because such a model
assumes linearity when the way these variables affect asset accumulation and child
outcomes is actually nonlinear.
FIGURE 4.1 ABOUT HERE

To address these two issues, the study proposes four empirical strategies,
focusing on several key confounding variables that affect both household assets and
child outcomes. As shown in Figure 4.1, some factors may influence household assets
(that is, household assets are endogenous variables). These factors include child
characteristics (e.g., disability types), program and services (e.g., Medicaid & SSI),
household socioeconomic status (e.g., income and education), and child outcomes.
The solid-line arrow in Figure 4.1 is the research interest of the study—asset effects
on child outcomes. In order to have a consistent estimate of asset effects,
confoundedness represented by the dotted-line arrows should be addressed.
Clearly, both child characteristics and programs/services can affect parents’
saving behaviors. For example, as a result of expensive health services needed by
their children with disabilities, parents are less likely to save, or parents may have
strong motives for precautionary savings for children’s health expenditure. In addition,
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the dependent measures of child outcomes (e.g., health service utilization and health
status) are likely to affect household assets as well. High levels of health service
utilization (indicated by the number of doctor visits and hospitalization) may decrease
household assets. Similarly, public service utilization or means-tested programs may
change parents’ saving behaviors as well. Public programs may crowd out the need
for private financial resources (e.g., savings).
4.2.1 Assets Measured Before Childbirth
Taking the advantage of longitudinal data, the first empirical strategy uses
household assets measured before childbirth. Specifically, the 1984, 1989, and 1994
asset measures are used for children born between 1985-1989, 1990-1994, and 19951997, respectively. This design is to address the above concern that household assets
may be affected by child outcome measures, other child characteristics, and program
services. Logically, everything that occurs after childbirth—such as children’s
disability type, development outcomes, and programs/services children receives—
cannot affect household assets measured before childbirth.
FIGURE 4.2 ABOUT HERE

Child outcome measures in the first strategy are defined at the second wave
(2002) of the PSID-CDS. This way, analyses can include all children who have a
disability in the first or second wave. This results in a slightly larger sample size
(N=732). By contrast, to choose outcome measures in the first wave (1997), those
reporting disabilities in the second wave would be excluded from the study sample; if
outcome measures in the third wave (2007) are chosen, then missing values raise a
concern because a high proportion of children are not interviewed as they are aged out
of the CDS survey (see Figure 3.1).
Household characteristics (the second and third groups of control variables,
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see Table 3.2) in this set of analyses are measured in the same year as asset measures
are. The other two groups of control variables—child characteristics and parenting
behaviors are defined at the first wave (1997) of the CDS. Figure 4.2 illustrates the
design of the first strategy. It is a simplified version of Equation 4.2 without including
asset measures in childhood (from A1 to At):

Yt = β0 A0 + Ot γ t (4.4)
Analyses employing the first empirical strategy have five model specifications
for each outcome measure. First, Model 1, the baseline model, includes only
household and child’s characteristics as independent variables. The second and third
models (Models 2 and 3) add the continuous and categorical asset measures,
respectively. Models 4 and 5 extend Models 2 and 3 by adding parenting behavior
variables. These five models are the major model specifications (with minor
modifications) in the other three empirical strategies as well.
4.2.2 Propensity Score Classification
The first strategy, although useful, cannot address the confoundedness of
household assets and other indicators of household socioeconomic status (e.g.,
household income and household head’s education). The confoundedness between
household assets and household socioeconomic status is unlikely to be linear and
additive. In this situation, the conventional approach of adding control variables in
regression may not address the confoundedness issue. Hence, the current study uses
propensity score classification (Imai & Van Dyk, 2004) in the second empirical
strategy. The same study sample for the first strategy (N=732, see Figure 4.2) is used.
An obvious advantage of the propensity score analysis is that it does not assume the
confoundedness between assets and other socioeconomic characteristics (e.g., income
and education) to be additive or linear. More important, it can be used to balance
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socioeconomic variables for households with different levels of assets.
The propensity score method was originally proposed by Rubin (1974, 1977,
1978, & 1986). There is extensive literature on this method (e.g., Guo & Fraser, 2009).
Briefly speaking, the propensity score method suggests that asset effects can be
consistently estimated only when individuals who have similar values on the
confounding variables are compared. If there is only one confounding factor, such as
household income, the practice is to first categorize the sample into multiple groups
by household income and then to estimate asset effects within each group. This
approach becomes rather cumbersome, however, if there are multiple confounding
variables, because it is difficult to simultaneously categorize multiple variables (the
high-dimensional issue).
To solve this problem, the propensity score approach estimates an individual’s
expected value on the focal independent variable using all observed confounding
variables. 10 The expected value (also called the propensity score) is a one-dimensional
balancing score for observed confounding variables. The study sample can be
classified, weighted, or matched based on this propensity score before the effect of the
independent variable is examined. Following this procedure, the study uses household
characteristics and household head’s characteristics (the second and third groups of
control variables) to predict asset values. The study sample then is categorized into
three groups by the predicted asset value. As indicated in Equation 4.5, asset effects
for children with disabilities are assessed within each group,

Yt g = β0 g A0 g + Og γ g

(4.5)

where the new subscription g indicates the number of groups created by propensity

10 In the case of a dichotomous focal independent variable or a dichotomous
“treatment” variable, its expected probability is estimated. Propensity score analysis
has been commonly used for this type of “treatment” variables.
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score classification. To be clear, in this strategy household assets are still measured
before childbirth ( A0 ). More detail about propensity score classification is provided in
Appendix A.
4.2.3 Fixed-Effects Models
Unobserved factors highlighted in Figure 4.1 may seriously bias the estimated
asset effects, but neither of the above discussed strategies can address this problem.
Time-invariant unobservable factors are typically addressed using the fixed-effects
regression model. The third empirical strategy proposes fixed-effects analyses to
further examine the effects of household assets for children with disabilities. Different
from the sample used in the first two strategies, the study sample of the third strategy
includes all PSID-CDS children reporting disability in any of the three waves
(N=1,056), and, theoretically, each subject is observed three times. 11 Table 4.1
displays the timing of the measures in the three observations.
TABLE 4.1 ABOUT HERE

Fixed-effects estimation of asset effects for children can be expressed as:

Yit = α i + β Ait + Oitγ + ε it , i = 1...1056,

t = 1, 2,3

(4.6)

Where i is individual and t is time points from Wave I to III, and the other notations
are consistent with the above equations. In this framework, α i estimates the
heterogeneous individual effect that is fixed over time for each subject. This
estimation also takes into account all unobserved factors that are time-invariant.
While it may seem reasonable to use the fixed-effects model to control for
unobserved effects, this does not appear to be completely consistent with the
11 Not all children have three observations in three waves of the PSID-CDS due to
missing data and changes of eligibility rules. For example, more than half of CDS
children were not eligible for CDS Wave III because they were older than 18 in 2007.
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conceptual model proposed in Equations 4.3. The fixed-effects model in Equation 4.6
can be further specified for the observations at the three waves, respectively:

Yit = α i + β Ait + Oitγ + ε it
Yit +1 = α i + β Ait +1 + Oit +1γ + ε it +1
Yit + 2 = α i + β Ait + 2 + Oit + 2γ + ε it + 2

(4.7)

A comparison of Equations 4.7 and Equations 4.3 reveals several differences. For
convenience, Equations 4.3 is slightly modified as follows (Equations 4.8):

Yit = (β0 Ai0 + β1Ai1 + β2 Ai2 + ...... + βt−1Ait −1) + βt Ait + Oitγ + μit
Yit +1 = (β ′0 Ai0 + β ′1 Ai1 + β ′2 Ai 2 + ...... + β ′t Ait ) + β ′t +1Ait +1 + Oit+1γ ′ + μit+1
Yit +2 = (β ′′0 Ai0 + β ′′1Ai1 + β ′′2 Ai2 + ...... + β ′′t Ait + β ′′t+1Ait +1) + β ′′t +2 Ait+2 + Oit+2γ ′′ + μit +2
First, it allows for different regression coefficients of asset measures ( βt , β 't+1, β ''t+2 )
over the three waves, while the fixed-effects model assumes a fixed regression
coefficient of asset measures over time ( β ). This inconsistency may not cause a
problem because the varied regression coefficients can be modeled in fixed-effects
analysis by adding the interaction term of assets and time.
Second, the fixed-effects model uses a fixed term α i to replace the three terms
in the parentheses in Equations 4.8. Theoretically, these terms are cumulative effects
of previous assets (current assets not included), and they are not likely to stay the
same over time. To fit the format of the fixed-effects model, Equations 4.8 can be
further modified as 4.9 below:

Yit =αi + βt Ait +Oitγ + (β0 Ai0 + β1Ai1 + β2 Ai2 +...... + βt−1Ait−1 −αi + μit )
Yit+1 =αi + β′t+1Ait+1 +Oit+1γ ′ +(β′0 Ai0 + β′1Ai1 + β′2 Ai2 +......β′t Ait −αi + μit+1)
Yit+2 =αi + β′′t+2 Ait+2 +Oit+2γ ′′ +(β′′0 Ai0 + β′′1Ai1 + β′′2 Ai2 +......β′′t Ait + β′′t+1Ait+1 −αi + μit+2)
In the model of Yit , the term in the parentheses is likely to be related to α i and Ait . So
are those in the models of Yit +1 and Yit + 2 . The three terms in the parentheses of
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Equations 4.9, unfortunately, are left out in the error term in the fixed-effects analyses,
and, therefore, violate the exogeneity assumption. This is a limitation of this strategy.
4.2.4 Dynamic Models
The violation of the exogeneity assumption in the fixed-effects model is in
part caused by the fixed-term α i . The first-difference estimator may better estimate
asset effects than the fixed-effects estimator because the former can control for
unobserved effects without imposing a fixed term. Approximately, the first difference
estimation of asset effects for children can be expressed as follows:

Yt +1 − Yt = β ( At +1 − At ) + (ε t +1 − ε t )
ΔYt +1 = βΔAt +1 + Δε t +1

or

(4.10)

Where ΔYt +1 is the difference of Yt +1 and Yt , and ΔAt +1 is the difference between At +1
and At . This expression of the first-difference estimation, however, shows an
inconsistency from the conceptual estimation of asset effects for children in Equations
4.3. To take the first difference in Equations 4.3 with the assumption of β t = β t′ = βt′′ ,
the obtained equation should be as follows:

ΔYt +1 = βt′+1 At +1 + Δε t +1 (4.11)
The key difference is that Equations 4.10 uses ΔAt +1 but Equation 4.11 uses At +1 as the
main predictor. The former suggests that changes in the child outcome measure
between age t and t+1 is caused by changes in household assets between the two time
periods. The latter, however, suggests that all assets at time t+1 are responsible for the
improvement or decline of child outcome at time t+1. Since household assets have
cumulative effects on child well-being, there is no need to assume that only asset
difference or new assets are important.
The limitations of the fixed-effects and first-difference models indicate the
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dynamics on child outcomes which, however, is not made explicit in Equations 4.3.
For example, it is relatively easy to see that the models of Yt + 2 and Yt +1 in Equations
4.3 include all the terms used by the model of Yt +1 and Yt , respectively. Therefore, a
different approach to this idea in Equations 4.3 is

Yt = δ Yt −1 + βt At
Yt +1 = δ ′Yt + β ′t +1 At +1

(4.12)

Yt + 2 = δ ′′Yt +1 + β ′′t + 2 At + 2
Child outcomes at age t are determined by child outcomes at age t-1 and household
assets at age t. Equations 4.12 clearly show the dynamic relationships between child
outcomes over time and their interactions with household assets. The dynamic panel
data can be estimated by the Arellano-Bond estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991).
Simply put, this estimator uses the difference of first difference in the dependent
variable as an instrument variable. For example, [(Yt + 2 − Yt +1 ) − (Yt +1 − Yt )] is an
instrumental variable for Yt +1 in the model of Yt + 2 . Unfortunately, this method works
only for observations in the last wave of the CDS because it requires information from
the two previous waves. The same method cannot be applied to the data in the first
and second waves because this requirement cannot be satisfied.
FIGURE 4.3 ABOUT HERE

Allison (2009) discusses a method to estimate the dynamic fixed-effects model
in the framework of Structural Equations Modeling (SEM). The key of this method is
to allow an estimation of the correlation between the independent variable (such as
assets) at the current stage and the error term of the dependent variable at the previous
stage. The fourth empirical strategy adopts this method suggested by Allison (2009),
and Figure 4.3 shows an elaboration of this method; the study sample for this strategy
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is the same as that in fixed-effects analyses. Not a measurement model here, the latent
variable α i in Figure 4.3 corresponds to the individual fixed term in Equations 4.7.
Different from the fixed-effects model, Figure 4.3 also estimates bt +1 (correlation
between ε t and At +1 ) and bt + 2 (correlation between ε t +1 and At + 2 ). The model in Figure
4.3 can also be demonstrated in Equations 4.13. Detailed information on this strategy
can be found in Appendix B.

Yit = α i + β Ait + ε it
Yit +1 = α i + β Ait +1 + δ Yt + ε it +1
Yit +2 = α i + β Ait +2 + δ Yt +1 + ε it +2

(4.13)

bt +1 = Corr ( At +1,ε t )

bt + 2 = Corr ( At + 2,ε t +1)
4.3 Summary
Proposing an empirical model of cumulative asset effects in Equations 4.3,
this chapter discusses four empirical strategies to test asset effects for children with
disabilities. In the first set of analyses, the study focuses on the effects of household
assets measured before childbirth. The second set of analyses categorizes the sample
used in the first strategy into multiple groups according to the propensity score of
household assets. The first two strategies are essentially analyses based on a crosssectional design. The third and fourth strategies then utilize the three-wave
longitudinal data from the PSID-CDS. The third set of analyses applies the fixedeffects model to control for time-invariant unobserved factors when estimating asset
effects for children with disabilities. The final analyses further test asset effects for
children in the dynamic model using Structural Equations Modeling (SEM). Four
strategies are developed with two considerations: (1) to address key confounding
factors using various methods, and (2) to include in analyses household assets
measured at different time periods. Results of analyses using these different strategies
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can be compared, which may offer insights into how asset effects change over the
course of child development.
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Chapter 5: Results of Cross-Sectional Analyses
This chapter discusses results of cross-sectional analyses in the first two
strategies (results are also summarized in Table 5.1). These two strategies use assets
measured before childbirth to avoid simultaneous effects between household assets
and child outcomes, and to avoid interactions between household assets and children’s
characteristics or services they received. The second strategy further applies
propensity score classification to tackle the potential confoundedness of household
assets and household background variables. The analyses are conducted on ten
imputed datasets created by the multiple imputation procedure (MI) 12, and are
weighted using the weight variable provided by the PSID. Each imputed dataset has
732 observations.
TABLE 5.1 ABOUT HERE

Overall, assets have expected associations with children’s educational and
health outcomes in the first set of analyses. As summarized in Table 5.1, net worth is
positively related to the applied problems score and the broad reading score, and
negatively associated with children’s school suspension or expulsion. Children living
in households with more liquid assets are less likely to repeat a grade or have school
suspension or expulsion. Household assets also have positive associations with
children’s global health status and are associated with reduced numbers of school
days missed due to physical illness, hospitalization, and doctor visits for physical
illness. The asset-health outcome association is consistently supported across different
asset measures (continuous vs. categorical), asset types (net worth vs. liquid assets),
and dependent variables. Health outcomes appear to be better measures than

12 I also conducted analyses on the original dataset without imputation. The results on
the original data through listwise deletion are similar to those from imputed datasets.
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educational outcomes in testing asset effect for children with disabilities. The findings,
especially those of categorical asset measures, also show that non-linear relationships
between assets and child outcomes can be identified when the amount of assets
exceeds certain thresholds.
The second set of analyses confirms the hypothesized asset effects on global
health status, school days missed due to illness, and the likelihood of hospitalization
for children with disabilities. These findings are consistent across different asset types
(net worth vs. liquid assets) and asset measures (continuous vs. categorical). By
comparing the results between groups with high and low expected asset values, the
second strategy also finds that household assets show greater influences in the group
with low expected asset values.
5.1 Descriptive Results
TABLE 5.2 ABOUT HERE

Table 5.2 reports descriptive statistics of the variables in this study. Children
in the sample are 12 years old on average in 2002. More than half of them are male,
and two out of every ten are black. Reported by primary caregivers, about 60% of
children have a disability condition in 1997 and 80% in 2002. Main disability types
among these children are hearing difficulty, seeing difficulty, learning disability, and
ADD/ADHD. Nearly 30% of children have special education experiences. In 2001,
6% of these children do not have any medical insurance, and one-fourth are covered
by government-provided programs (i.e., Medicaid, state-sponsored program, or
military health care). Since very few children are covered by private insurance plans,
they are grouped together with those who have employer-provided insurance plans
(71%).
At the time when household assets are measured, 80% of households are led
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by males, and nearly 80% of household heads are employed. The mean household
size and number of children are 3.4 and 1.3. A proportion of households in the sample
receive public assistance, such as Food Stamps (21%), AFDC (37%), and SSI (31%).
The average household income in the previous five years is less than $30,000. 13 At
the time when child outcomes are observed (2002), the mean age of children’s
mothers is 38, and about 70% of them are married. More than half of these mothers
have some college.
For educational outcomes, the mean standardized scores of the applied
problems test and the broad reading test are 102. About one-sixth of children have
repeated a grade. Similarly, one-sixth of children have been suspended or expelled
from school. Regarding health outcomes, half of the primary caregivers report
children having excellent health. On average, children have 3.4 school days missed
due to physical illness and 2.4 doctor visits for illness in the previous 12 months.
Nearly 40% of children have seen a psychiatrist, psychologist, doctor, or counselor
about an emotional, mental, or behavior problem. In the last five years, the average
number of hospitalization is .28. The maximum number of school days missed, doctor
visits for illness, and hospitalization is 55, 20, and 60, respectively.
The mean and median of household net worth in the sample are $64,000 and
$12,000, respectively. Five percent of households have zero net worth, while onesixth have a net worth value below zero. Households with net worth from $0-$10,000,
$10,001-$40,000, and above $40,000 take 28%, 24%, and 30% of the sample,
respectively. The mean ($21,243) and median ($1,600) of household liquid assets are
substantially smaller than those of net worth. About 20% of households have no liquid

13 Household economic resources are not inflation-adjusted in analyses. The
inflation-adjusted measures of household economic resources (income and assets) do
not generate different results in sensitivity tests.
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assets whatsoever, and one out of every four households has liquid assets in the range
of $1-$1,000. Twenty-seven percent of children live in households with liquid assets
ranging from $1,001 to $10,000, and another 27% own liquid assets greater than
$10,000. Table 5.2 describes the distribution of each parenting variable. More than
60% of parents expect their children to finish at least a four-year college.
5.2 Household Assets and Educational Outcomes
TABLES 5.3 AND 5.4 ABOUT HERE

Sections 5.2 and 5.3 discuss results of the first empirical strategy. Tables 5.3
and 5.4 report the regression coefficients and their significance of major variables in
the five models (see the discussion of model specifications in Chapter 4). OLS
regression is applied to the continuous educational outcomes (the applied problems
score and the broad reading score); Probit regression is conducted for the
dichotomous outcome measures (children’s experiences of repeating a grade, school
suspension or expulsion, and doctor visits for emotional problems); and Negative
Binomial regression is used for the count outcome measures (number of school days
missed, hospitalization, doctor visits for physical illness). Results for the control
variables have expected directions and are discussed briefly in Chapter 7. The full
results can be requested from the author of the dissertation.
5.2.1 Applied Problems Score
The baseline model (Model 1, See Panel A of Table 5.3) includes only the
five-year average of household income and other control variables. Household
average income is positively and significantly related to children’s applied problems
scores (b=3.75, p<.05); a 100% increase in income raises the score by
3.75*log(2)=2.6 points. The income variable remains significant in other models, but
its regression coefficient (b=2.95, p<.1) reduces by 25% when asset variables and
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parenting behavior variables are added.
Log-transformed net worth, however, does not have a significant association
with children’s applied problems scores. When net worth is categorized into four
groups, children with the highest level of net worth (>$40,000) have applied problems
scores significantly greater than those with net worth in the ranges of $0-10,000 and
$10,001-$40,000 (b=5.40, p<.1, see Model 3). To practically interpret this five-point
difference, the finding can be compared to income effects. To lift the applied
problems score by five points, household income should increase by nearly 200%.
This amount of change in income does not seem likely because income is a “flow”
variable, and household human capital tends to be fixed in the short term. The second
approach is to compare the estimated asset effects on the applied problems score with
the score gap between the CDS children who have finished high school and those who
have not. Table 5.5 reports the means of two WJ-R test scores by the educational
attainment of the PSID-CDS children. 14 It shows that the CDS children who have
finished high school have the applied problems score five points higher than those
who have not.
TABLE 5.5 ABOUT HERE

As suggested in Model 3 with the categorical measure of net worth, children
living in households with negative net worth have higher scores than those in the
reference group ($0-$10,000), but the difference is not statistically significant.
Negative net worth may indicate households have access to the credit market. These
households may be better off than zero-net-worth households with borrowing

14 The statistics in Table 5.5 only include the CDS children who are 18 years old and
above in 2007.
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constraints (Nam & Huang, 2009; Zhan & Sherraden, 2010).
FIGURE 5.1 ABOUT HERE

The insignificance of net worth in Models 2 and 4 may be due to the fact that
this continuous measure fails to capture the nonlinear relationship between net worth
and the applied problems score. Based on the estimation from Models 2 and 3, Figure
5.1 plots the predicted applied problem score by net worth for a typical child in the
sample. 15 The top of the vertical dotted lines represents the predicted applied
problems score by the categorical measure of net worth; the predicted applied
problems score is 106.8, 103.7, 103.7, and 109.1, respectively, for the four net worth
groups from low to high. The solid black line is the predicted score by continuous net
worth (log-transformed), and the predicted score is nearly the same across different
net worth values, ranging from 105.3 to 105.7. Comparing these two estimates, it
seems clear that the continuous measure is not able to capture the U-shape
relationship between household assets and the dependent variable. 16 The U-shape
trend makes the slope of the solid line close to 0.
Among the four hypothesized mediators, parental involvement in child
development and parents’ educational expectations are positively related to children’s
math scores. In Model 5, one point increase in parental involvement suggests an
increase of 0.7 points in the applied problems score (b=.73, p<.05). Parents’
expectations for children to have an education at a four-year college and above are

15 A typical child has all control variables defined at their median values. Please see
Table 5.2 for these variables’ median values.
16 It is important to note that both measures, log-transformation and four categorical
levels, are arbitrary without theoretical support.
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associated with a 6-point gain in the score (b=5.58, p<.05). 17 The directions of these
results are consistent with previous studies (e.g., Zhan, 2006). However, to include
parenting behavior variables hardly changes the regression coefficient of net worth.
The proposed mediation mechanism is not supported.
Table 5.4 replaces net worth with liquid assets and homeownership. Results of
control variables are consistent (Full results can be requested from the author of the
dissertation). Homeownership is positively but not significantly related to children’s
applied problem scores. However, in the models with the categorical measure of
liquid asset, children living in households with zero liquid assets (the lowest category)
show the highest average score on the applied problems test, nearly six points greater
than that for the second lowest category ($1-$1,000). Those with liquid assets ranging
from $1,001-$10,000 (the second highest category) have the lowest score. Figure 5.2
illustrates the trend of liquid asset effects for a typical child in the sample. Due to the
nonlinear nature of asset effects, the asset effect hypothesis may or may not be
supported depending on which distribution segment is under examination.
FIGURE 5.2 ABOUT HERE

What is puzzling is that the lowest liquid asset category ($0) actually has the
highest predicted score. In the case that children with negative net worth have
relatively high scores, a possible explanation is that their families may have access to
the credit market, but it is not clear why children with zero liquid assets have the
highest score. Different model specifications are tested by adding other asset
measures, such as the total unsecured debt value, home value, home equity value, and

17 While parents’ educational expectation is measured in 1997 and the applied
problem score is in 2002, it is possible that there is a two-way causality between these
two variables.
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even total net worth value 18 in the model, respectively. Results of liquid assets do not
change significantly. Another possibility is that there is measurement error in liquid
assets, which causes the unexpected results discussed above. For instance, some
households do not report accurate information regarding their liquid assets. Those
having a value zero on the liquid assets measure report a lower value than what it
actually is.
5.2.2. Broad Reading Score
Results on children’s broad reading scores (see Panel B of Tables 5.3 and 5.4)
are consistent with those on the applied problems scores, and therefore are briefly
discussed here. Children in households with the highest net worth category (>$40,000)
have broad reading scores five points higher than those with net worth from $0 to
$10,000 (b=5.17, p<.05, Model 3). Again this five-point difference is equal to the
score gap between those who have finished high school and those who have not (see
Table 5.5). If educational or cognitive achievement is an important determinant of
high school dropouts, the effect size of household assets is substantial.
Children in households with liquid assets from $1 to $1,000 have the lowest
broad reading score, and those with zero liquid assets instead have the highest score.
The difference between these two groups is 7.48 (p<.05, Model 3). An interesting
finding here is that parental warmth is negatively associated with children’s reading
scores.
5.2.3 Repeated Grades
Panel C of Table 5.3 focuses on the net worth measures; none of the reported
variables has a statistically significant association with the outcome measure of

18 When total net worth value is controlled for, the model is testing the association
between liquid assets and the applied problems score given that households have the
same level of net worth.
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repeating a grade. However, children living in households with liquid assets in the
range of $1-$1,000 are most likely to repeat a grade (Panel C of Table 5.4); the
differences between this and other three categories are all statistically significant. On
one hand, it suggests that children are more likely to repeat a grade when household
liquid assets increase from $0 to $1-$1,000 (b=.55, p<.05). This finding is puzzling.
On the other hand, it shows that, excluding those with zero liquid assets, the more
liquid assets households have, the less likely children are to repeat a grade. To include
parenting variables does not change the results of household assets.
FIGURE 5.3 ABOUT HERE

To show the effect size of liquid assets for a typical child, the predicted
probability of repeating a grade by the level of liquid assets is plotted in Figure 5.3.
All the four categories have relatively low probabilities (from 2.3% to 10%). However,
a comparison of these categories suggests the importance of liquid assets: children in
households with $1-$1000 liquid assets have a predicted probability of repeating a
grade about three times higher than those with liquid assets in the two highest liquid
asset categories.
5.2.4 School Suspension or Expulsion
FIGURE 5.4 ABOUT HERE

Analyses of children’s school suspension or expulsion show a different pattern
in the results. First, the continuous measure of net worth becomes statistically
significant and is negatively related to the probability of school suspension or
expulsion (b=-.03, p<.05). As displayed in Figure 5.4, this result is caused by an
explicit negative association between net worth and school suspension or expulsion. A
comparison of those with negative and positive net worth can show this more clearly.
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For the categorical net worth measure, children in households with negative net worth
are statistically more likely to experience school suspension or expulsion than other
children (b=.48, p<.05, Model 3). Those with negative net worth are about two times
more likely to experience school suspension or expulsion than others. Among the four
parental behavior variables, only parental involvement reduces children’s probability
of school suspension or expulsion (b=-.10, p<.05, Model 5).
FIGURE 5.5 ABOUT HERE

Results of liquid assets tell a different story. The continuous liquid asset
measure does not have a significant relationship with the outcome measure. For the
categorical one, the category of $1-$1,000 is related to the highest likelihood of
school suspension (28% in Figure 5.5), statistically different from the other two liquid
asset categories ($0 and $1,001-$10,000). The N-shape effects of liquid assets
displayed in Figure 5.5 provide an explanation of why the continuous liquid asset
measure does not have a significant association with this outcome measure. But
substantively it is not clear why there is an N-shape liquid asset effect. The outcome
difference between the two categories, $1-$1,000 and $1,001-$10,000, is not
statistically significant after controlling for parenting behavior variables, which may
support the proposed mediation mechanism.
To sum up the results regarding the educational outcomes in the first empirical
strategy, the categorical measure of net worth has expected association with all
educational outcomes except repeated grades. The continuous net worth measure is
statistically significant only in the analyses of school suspension or expulsion. The
hypothesis that high liquid assets are associated with low probability of repeating a
grade and school suspension or expulsion is partially supported depending on which
distribution segment is examined. An unexpected finding is that, compared to the
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other groups, children with zero liquid assets do not have the worst performance, as
indicated by these educational outcomes, and, surprisingly, they even have the highest
scores on two WJ-R tests. This result could be caused by the measurement error in
liquid assets, especially for those reporting zero liquid assets. The hypothesized
mediation mechanism of asset effects through parenting behavior variables is not
supported except for one analysis of school suspension or expulsion.
5.3 Household Assets and Health Outcomes
Tables 5.6 (net worth) and 5.7 (liquid assets) describe the relationships
between household assets and health outcomes of children with disabilities in the first
empirical strategy.
TABLES 5.6 AND 5.7 ABOUT HERE

5.3.1 Global Health Measure
Results on the continuous net worth fail to support the hypothesis of asset
effects on the global health. In Model 3 for the categorical measure, parents with net
worth above $10,000 are more likely to report “excellent health” for their children
(b=.33, p<.1 for net worth from $10,001-$40,000 and b=.41, p<.05 for net worth
greater than $40,000). None of the parental behavior variables shows a significant
association with children’s global health status. Theoretically, parents’ educational
expectations can be excluded from the analyses of health outcomes, but they are still
kept in these models for the purpose of comparing analyses of health outcomes and
educational outcomes.
FIGURE 5.6 ABOUT HERE

Figure 5.6 displays the predicted probability of reporting excellent health by
net worth for a typical child in the sample. The probability of having excellent health
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is .66, .63, .75, and .77, respectively, for the four net worth categories. If households
have net worth more than $10,000, the likelihood of reporting excellent health (75%)
is about 10% higher than those with net worth less than $10,000.
FIGURE 5.7 ABOUT HERE

Results are even stronger when household net worth is replaced with liquid
assets. Both log-transformed liquid assets (b=.06, p<.01) and the categorical liquid
asset measure (b=.63, .39, and .69, respectively, for three liquid asset groups, p<.1)
are positively associated with children’s global health status. Figure 5.7 plots the
predicted probability of having excellent health by liquid assets. It suggests that the
positive slope of the continuous liquid asset measure mainly captures the difference
between households with zero liquid assets and those with positive liquid assets. A
comparison of Figures 5.6 and 5.7 indicates that liquid assets have larger impacts on
children’s global health status than net worth. For instance, the predicted probability
of children having excellent health is 63% for households with net worth $1-$10,000,
but is 75% (the mean of 78% and 71%) for those with liquid assets $1-$10,000.
5.3.2 School Days Missed due to Illness
FIGURE 5.8 ABOUT HERE

In Panel B of Table 5.6, an increase in net worth decreases the number of
school days missed due to physical illness (b=-.02 for the continuous measure, p<.05;
b=-.35 and -.56 for the two top net worth categories, p<.05). As predicted from the
continuous net worth measure, the number of school days missed is from 3.4 to 2.9
(see Figure 5.8). Results regarding the categorical net worth measure indicate a
greater effect: the number of school days missed for the lowest net worth group (3.3
days) is about 1.7 times of that for the highest net worth group (1.8 days).
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FIGURE 5.9 ABOUT HERE

Analyses of liquid assets yield similar findings (see Figure 5.9). Liquid assets,
either continuous (b=-.05, p<.05) or categorical (b=-.42, p<.05 for the highest-liquidasset group), reduce children’s school days missed due to physical illness. For the
same outcome variable, liquid assets have greater influences than net worth. At the
level of $1,000, the predicted number of school days missed is 3.2 for net worth and is
2.6 for liquid assets.
5.3.3 Hospitalization
FIGURES 5.10 AND 5.11 ABOUT HERE

The frequency of hospitalization in the previous five years decreases when
parents’ net worth increases (b=-.04, p<.1, Model 2 in Panel C, Table 5.6). In the
analyses using the categorical net worth measure, asset effects are mainly reflected in
the difference in the frequency of hospitalization between the highest category of net
worth and the other categories (b=-.79, p<.1, Model 3). As expected, the predicted
frequency of hospitalization is very small (from .02 to .06 in Figure 5.10) since
hospitalization rarely happens. Although the absolute frequency is extremely low, the
relative effects across different levels of net worth are substantial. Children in the
lowest net worth group (<$0) are hospitalized three times more than those in the
highest net worth group (>$40,000).
It is somehow unexpected that parental warmth is statistically and positively
related to children’s hospitalization in Models 4 and 5, possibly because children’s
health services may affect parental warmth. Children who are more likely to be
hospitalized also receive more attention from parents. Finally, similar to net worth,
liquid assets reduce the number of children’s hospitalization (b=-.19, p<.01 for the
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continuous measure; b=-.83, -2.38, and -1.80, p<.05 for the three liquid asset groups;
see Panel C in Table 5.7 and Figure 5.11). As indicated in Figures 5.10 and 5.11, the
marginal effects of liquid assets seem greater than those of net worth.
5.3.4 Doctor Visits for Illness
FIGURE 5.12 ABOUT HERE

Results of doctor visits due to physical illness show the same pattern as those
of school days missed due to physical illness, probably because both outcome
measures are related to children’s physical illness. Reported in Panel D of Table 5.6,
the continuous (b=-.02, p<.1) and categorical (b=-.28 and b=-.51 for the two highestnet-worth groups, p<.1) net worth measures are negatively related to the number of
doctor visits for physical illness. Compared to children in the reference category of
net worth (see Figure 5.12), the number of doctor visits due to physical illness in the
last 12 months is 90% higher if households have negative net worth, and is 10% lower
if households have net worth in the highest category ($40,000). Liquid assets are
negatively linked to children’s doctor visits for illness (b=-.06, p<.05 for the
continuous measure; b=-.37 and b=-.44 for the two highest-liquid-asset groups, p<.1,
see Panel D in Table 5.7), and seem to be more important on the number of children’s
doctor visits than net worth.
FIGURE 5.13 ABOUT HERE

5.3.5 Doctor Visits for Emotional Problems
Doctor visits for emotional problems are measured by a dichotomous indicator
(Yes/No). None of the variables listed in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 has statistically
significant impacts on children’s probability of doctor visits for emotional problems
in the preceding 12 months.
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To sum up, in the first empirical strategy, household assets have expected
effects on almost all health outcomes for children with disabilities except doctor visits
for emotional problems. These findings are consistent across different asset types (net
worth vs. liquid assets) and different measurement of assets (continuous vs.
categorical). In general, asset effects on health outcomes estimated from liquid assets
or categorical measures are greater than those from net worth or continuous measures.
5.4 Average Asset Effects after Propensity Score Classification
Sections 5.4 and 5.5 report the estimated asset effects after propensity score
classification. More detail about the procedure of propensity score classification is
provided in Appendix A. Only Models 2 and 3 in the first set of analyses are used
since Models 4 and 5 fail to provide evidence of the proposed mediation mechanism
(through parenting behavior variables). The continuous asset measures are tested in
Model 2, and the categorical asset measures are tested in Model 3. In addition, several
dependent variables (frequency of school days missed, hospitalization, and doctor
visits for physical illness) are recoded into dichotomous ones (having frequencies
greater than 0=1 and otherwise=0) in order for Probit regression to be applied. It
becomes more difficult for Negative binomial models to be converged after
propensity score classification.
TABLES 5.8 AND 5.9 ABOUT HERE

First, as shown in Tables 5.8 and 5.9, the regression coefficients of logtransformed net worth have the expected direction, but none of them is statistically
significant. This is different from results of the first set of analyses in Sections 5.2 and
5.3, in which log-transformed net worth is statistically and negatively related to
school suspension or expulsion, school days missed due to illness, and frequency of
hospitalization and doctor visits for illness.
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Results on the categorical net worth measure are somewhat different from
those of the continuous measure. Children living in households with the highest level
of net worth (>$40,000) are more likely to report having excellent health (b=.57,
p<.1), less likely to miss school due to illness (b=-.99, p<.01), and less likely to have
been hospitalized in the previous five years (b=-.97, p<.01). The regression
coefficients of the categorical measures of net worth in the models of school days
missed and hospitalization, however, cannot be compared with those in the first set of
analyses because they are different regression models (Probit in the second set vs.
Negative binomial in the first set). The regression coefficient of net worth in the
model of global health status (b=.57) is slightly higher than that in Table 5.6 (b=.41).
Findings regarding net worth are well supported by the analyses on liquid
assets. The significant associations between net worth and health outcomes are also
confirmed in the analyses using liquid assets. Household liquid assets are positively
related to the probability of reporting excellent health and are negatively associated
with the likelihood of school days missed due to physical illness and hospitalization.
Furthermore, the associations between liquid assets and outcome measures appear
even stronger. For example, the continuous liquid asset measure shows a significant
association with each of these outcome measures, but the continuous net worth
measure does not. In terms of the categorical measures, not only children in the
highest liquid asset group (>$10,000) but also those in the second highest liquid asset
group ($1,000-$10,000) have better health outcomes.
A comparison of the first two sets of analyses suggests that asset effects for
children with disabilities may be better reflected in health outcomes, such as global
health status, school days missed, and hospitalization. Two empirical strategies
generate consistent findings on these outcomes. In addition, these analyses, especially
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the ones using the categorical asset measures, confirm that asset effects are nonlinear.
For future research, it is important to identify the thresholds of asset effects to inform
the development of asset-based policies.
5.5 Average Asset Effects for Subsamples
In fact, the average asset effects for the entire sample reported in Tables 5.8
and 5.9 are an aggregation of those in the three groups—households with high-, mid-,
and low-expected assets (see Appendix A and Figure A.1). Asset effects for each of
these groups are worth a closer examination as well. For asset-based policy to be
inclusive (that is, to include low-income and low-wealth population in asset
accumulation), it seems particularly important to examine asset effects for those with
low-expected assets. With this consideration, this section investigates the average
asset effects for those with high- and low-expected assets, respectively.
TABLE 5.10 ABOUT HERE

As shown in Table 5.9 above, liquid assets show stronger associations with
health outcomes than net worth does. For simplicity, Table 5.10 lists only the results
of liquid assets on three health outcomes for the groups of high- and low-expected
assets. For the categorical measure of liquid assets, Table 5.10 only reports the
regression coefficients of the highest-liquid-asset group (>$10,000).
First, the regression coefficient of liquid assets is greater in the low-expected
asset group than that in the high-expected asset group, indicating greater asset effects
for the group of low-expected assets. For example, in the analysis of hospitalization
using the log-transformed liquid assets, the regression coefficient for the lowexpected asset group is five times that in the high-expected group (b=-.15 vs. b=-.03).
Since the estimated standard error is about the same for the two groups, asset effects
are more likely to be statistically different from 0 in the low-expected asset group.
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Neither the continuous nor the categorical measure of liquid assets is statistically
significant in the high-expected asset group. However, several significant associations
are identified in the low-expected group. In addition, the p value is close to the .1
level for the categorical liquid asset measure in the models of school days missed and
hospitalization for the low-expected group. A comparison of asset effects between the
high- and low-expected asset groups suggests that it is efficient for asset-based
policies to focus on low-income and low-wealth families.
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Chapter 6: Results of Longitudinal Analyses
This chapter focuses on the three-wave longitudinal data analyses using fixedeffects models and structural equations modeling (SEM), in which each CDS child
with a disability has three observations (ideally). Educational and health outcomes are
measured in the three CDS waves (1997, 2002, and 2007), and household assets are
measured in 1994, 1999, and 2003, respectively (see Table 4.1 for details). Different
from the first set of analyses, for most of the participants in the sample, assets are not
measured before childbirth. 19 Also different from the second one intended to control
for the “observed” confounders, longitudinal analyses control for unobserved or
unmeasured time-invariant factors.
TABLE 6.1 ABOUT HERE

The analyses are conducted on the ten imputed datasets created from the
multiple imputation procedure (MI), 20 and are weighted using the weight variable
provided by the PSID. Each imputed dataset has 1,065 children and 3,195 (=1065*3)
observations. The real sample size is not balanced, however. It varies depending on (1)
whether the child is interviewed in a specific wave; (2) whether the child is eligible
for certain survey questions on outcome measures; and (3) whether the child has
different responses to the same measure in the three waves. For instance, 122 (out of
1,065) children are not interviewed in the CDS Wave II due to the change of survey
eligibility and another 500 children aged out of the CDS Wave III. Only children
older than three years can take the WJ-R tests, and only those older than five years
could have the experience of repeating a grade or school suspension. Since fixed-

19 Children born between 1995 and 1997 have the first asset measure before
childbirth.
20 I also conducted analyses on the original dataset without imputation.
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effects analysis does not allow time-invariant dependent variables, children who give
the same response on the outcome measure in all three waves have to be excluded
from analysis.
6.1 Descriptive Statistics
TABLE 6.2 ABOUT HERE

Table 6.2 reports the descriptive statistics from fixed-effects analyses.
Consistent with the first study sample used in Chapter 5, children with disabilities
have a mean age of 12 years. Pooling all observations together, about 26% of them
have special education experiences, and about 50% have disability conditions.
When household asset measures are observed, 82% of household heads are
employed. The mean household size and number of children are 4.2 and 2.09,
respectively, greater than those in the first strategy. The difference indicates the
changes of household composition in 15 years. Households receiving public
assistance in this sample are not as many as those in Chapter 5 (i.e., Food Stamp: 17%
vs. 21%, AFDC/TANF: 7% vs. 37%, and SSI: 6% vs. 31%), in part due to the drastic
policy change after the 1996 welfare reform and in part due to improved family
economic status in mid-adulthood. Compared to the sample used for the first strategy,
the average income ($61,696 vs. $29,139) doubled in the 15 years largely due to
income growth from young to mid adulthood of parents, macro economic
development during this period, and inflation.
The mean scores of the applied problems test and the broad reading test are
102 and 100, respectively. About one-seventh observations have a positive response
to the question of repeating a grade, and one-seventh have a positive response to the
question of school suspension or expulsion. Table 6.2 also reports the percentage of
children with dependent variables lacking within-subject variation over time. These
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children will not be included in fixed-effects analyses (LM2 and LM3). Distributions
of health outcomes in this sample are similar to those reported in Table 5.2.
The mean of net worth rises from $64,000 (Table 5.2) to $176,000 (Table 6.2),
which substantially changes the distribution of the categorical net worth measure. The
mean of liquid assets increases even faster (four times), but, interestingly, the
distribution of the categorical liquid assets is about the same for the two samples. This
may indicate growing wealth inequality over the years. Increases in liquid assets
mostly occur in a small group of households that already had relatively high liquid
assets, and as a result, the categorical distribution does not show much change.
6.2 Household Assets and Educational Outcomes
Sections 6.2 and 6.3 report results of fixed-effects analyses. Model
specification used for fixed-effects analyses is slightly different from that in the first
set of analyses. First, the analyses remove control variables (such as child’s gender,
race, and disability type) that show no or little change over time. Fixed-effects models
cannot estimate coefficients of variables that have no within-subject variation. Second,
some variables, while relevant, cannot be included in longitudinal analysis simply
because they are not recorded in all CDS waves (e.g., types of health insurance for the
PSID-CDS children).
For each asset measure, three models are examined: LM1, LM2, and LM3
(LM stands for Longitudinal Model). LM1 is a pooled cross-sectional baseline model
that pools three observations of each child and runs a cross-sectional analysis directly
regardless of the fact that they are from the same subject. LM2 is a fixed-effects
analysis without including parenting behavior variables, and LM3 adds parenting
behavior variables to LM2. Results of LM1 can be examined in comparison to those
of the first strategy in Chapter 5 since both have the same cross-sectional estimator.

56

More comparison can be done with those from LM2 and LM3 to see whether fixedeffects estimator has corrected any unobserved bias.
Specifically, OLS regression is applied to the continuous outcome measures
(the applied problems score and the broad reading score); Logit regression is
conducted for the dichotomous outcome measures (repeated grade, school
suspension/expulsion, global health, and doctor visits for emotional problems); and
Poisson regression is used for the count outcome measures (frequency of school days
missed, hospitalization, and doctor visits for illness). Logit and Poisson regressions
for fixed-effects model are also called conditional Logit and conditional Poisson
models. Different from the first strategy in Chapter 5, this strategy does not use Probit
regression for the dichotomous outcome measures because the conditional Probit
cannot be conducted. Neither does this strategy apply Negative Binomial regression
for the count variable because it has been argued that the code to test Negative
Binomial fixed-effects analysis in Stata is not a true conditional model (Allison, 2009).
TABLES 6.3 AND 6.4 ABOUT HERE

Tables 6.3 and 6.4 demonstrate asset effects on educational outcomes for
children with disabilities in fixed-effects analyses. Full results for the control
variables can be requested from the author of the dissertation. Overall, household
assets do not appear to be related to cognitive achievement or intellectual ability
measured by two WJ-R test scores—the applied problems and the broad reading
scores. However, household assets are more likely to affect school attainment.
Children in households with more assets are less likely to repeat a grade or be
suspended from school.
6.2.1 Applied Problems and Broad Reading Scores (Continuous Variables)
The pooled cross-sectional analyses (LM1 in Table 6.3) shows that the
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increase in net worth strengthens children’s academic performance measured by the
applied problems (b=.30, p<.05) and broad reading scores (b=.28, p<.05). This
association appears only at the level of $40,000 and above for the categorical net
worth measure in LM1. These results are similar to those in the first set of analyses:
Log-transformed net worth in fixed-effects analyses shows greater effects probably
because the measurement timing of assets is closer to that of the outcome measures in
this sample.
However, none of the net worth measures in fixed-effects analyses (LM2&3)
shows a statistically significant association with the two test scores, although children
in households with the highest net worth category (above $40,000) have better
performance on both tests. In other words, after controlling for initial scores, any
change in household assets is not related to the child’s later cognitive performance.
Overall, fixed-effects analyses produce results consistent with those using propensity
score classification (see Table 5.8). Among the parenting behavior variables of
interest, parental stress negatively correlates with the applied problems score, and
parents’ educational expectation of four-year college and above is positively related to
the broad reading score. Analyses involving liquid assets yield the same results (see
Table 6.4).
6.2.2 Repeated Grades (Dichotomous Variable)
The pooled cross-sectional analyses (LM1) of repeated grades again support
the asset-effect hypothesis. Household asset holding contributes to a decreased
probability of a child’s repeating a grade (b=-.05 for the continuous net worth
measure, p<.05), especially for those with net worth above $40,000 (b=-.79, p<.05).
This association is not supported in the first set of analyses (Table 5.3).
Fixed-effects analyses (LM2&3 in Table 6.3) show stronger impacts of net
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worth on repeated grades. The regression coefficient of log-transformed net worth
increases from -.09 (p<.01) in LM2 to -.11 (p<.01) in LM3 when parenting behavior
variables are entered. The estimation in LM2 with log-transformed net worth suggests
that the odds of repeating a grade reduce by 6% when net worth doubles. In LM2 with
the categorical net worth measure, the odds of repeating a grade for children in the
reference category ($0-$10,000) are only one-fourth of those with negative net worth
(b=1.48, p<.01), but 1.6 times greater than those in the highest net worth category
(b=-.49, p<.05). What needs to be noted is that nearly 65% of children are excluded
from the analyses because they have never repeated a grade. Therefore, the findings
are only applicable to children included in the analyses.
All parenting behavior variables except for parenting stress are negatively and
statistically associated to a child’s likelihood to repeat a grade. Interestingly, net
worth shows stronger effects when parenting behavior variables are entered, which
contradicts the mediation hypothesis above. This may suggest an alternative
hypothesis: given the same level of parenting, the more financial assets parents invest
in child development, the better outcomes children achieve.
The analyses on liquid assets (Table 6.4) provide consistent but slightly
different results. First, when liquid assets increase by 100%, the odds of repeating a
grade reduce by merely 4% (b=-.05 in LM2 with the continuous liquid assets, p<.05),
smaller than the estimated effect of net worth. Second, for the categorical liquid asset
measure, the highest category (above $10,000) does not show different odds from the
reference category ($0). The two categories in the middle ($1-$1,000 and $1,001$10,000) instead have odds nearly 50% lower than those in the reference category
(b=-.56 and b=-.61 in LM2, p<.01). Homeownership is also examined. When
parenting behavior variables are controlled for, the regression coefficient of
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homeownership almost doubles. In LM3, children from families owning a house have
about 65% reduced odds of repeating a grade than children from families not owning
a house (p<.01).
6.2.3 School Suspension or Expulsion (Dichotomous Variable)
Findings regarding this outcome measure are relatively simple. The analyses
exclude about 55% of children because they have no experience of school suspension
or expulsion. Fixed-effects analyses with the categorical net worth measure find that
children from households with net worth from $10,001-$40,000 are less likely to
experience school suspension or expulsion than those from households with net worth
from $0-$10,000 (b=-.62, odds ratio=.54, p<.05). For the categorical liquid asset
measure, this negative association only appears in the category of above $10,000 as
compared to the reference category ($0), with a regression coefficient of -.78 (p<.01).
Homeownership again is a significant factor protecting children from school
suspension or expulsion. The odds of being suspended or expelled from school for
children of homeowners are 40% lower (p<.01).
6.3 Household Assets and Health Outcomes
Fixed-effects results on net worth and health outcome, reported in Table 6.5,
are similar to those in the first two sets of analyses. These results are discussed by
each health outcome respectively below.
TABLE 6.5 ABOUT HERE

6.3.1 Global Health Status (Dichotomous Variable)
Fixed-effects analyses show the odds of reporting excellent health increases by
2% (b=.03, p<.05), when net worth doubles. It suggests that asset building may be
more efficient for those with low wealth because it may be relatively easy to double a
small value of net worth. For the categorical net worth measure, the reference group
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($0-$10,000) has the lowest odds of reporting excellent health, which are 25%, 50%,
and 60% lower than the negative net worth category, the category of $10,001-$40,000,
and the category of above $40,000. The positive slope of the log-transformed net
worth seems to capture mainly the growing trend of reporting excellent health from
$0-$10,000; $10,001-$40,000; and above $40,000.
Although all four parenting behavior variables are highly associated with
children’s global health status, some of them have unexpected directions. For example,
both parental warmth and parents’ educational expectations for children to have some
college predict children’s global health negatively. This negative correlation may
suggest a misspecification in analyses—parental warmth could be parents’ responses
to children’s health status. However, it is still a puzzle as to why parents’ education
expectation at the level of some college (as compared to the expectation of high
school graduation) has a negative association with children’s global health status.
TABLE 6.6 ABOUT HERE

Results of liquid assets show a greater marginal effect. When liquid assets are
doubled, the odds of having excellent health increase by 4% (b=.06, p<.01). Therefore,
households should be encouraged to accumulate liquid assets for the purpose of
improving health. The mechanism of asset effects on health outcomes may be related
to the liquidity of assets or service purchase.
While it does not appear to be a significant predictor of outcome measures in
the first two strategies, homeownership expands children’s opportunity to have
excellent health, especially when parenting behavior variables are controlled for.
Owning a home increases children’s odds of having excellent health by 30% (b=.31
and b=.28 in two LM3s, p<.05).
6.3.2 School Days Missed due to Illness (Count Variable)
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The estimated effects (b=-.03, p<.05) of the log-transformed net worth on
children’s school days missed due to illness are very close to those in the first strategy
(b=-.02). However, this negative link is not supported by the analyses of the
categorical net worth measure, in which not only the negative net worth category
(b=.51, p<.01) but also the two other categories with higher net worth values (b=.29
for $10,001-$40,000 and b=.40 for above $40,000, p<.01) have greater coefficients
than the reference category ($0-$10,000). In other words, the reference category has
the fewest school days missed.
FIGURES 6.1 AND 6.2 ABOUT HERE

To a large extent, this controversy has to do with the selection of the reference
category of net worth. When the negative net worth category is chosen as the
reference group, the other three categories all have a negative coefficient, statistically
significant at the .1 level (see Figure 6.1). Then, the findings do not conflict with
those from the continuous measure. The negative slope for the log-transformed net
worth reflects the difference in school days missed between children with negative
and positive net worth.
The predicted number of school days missed for a typical child is shown in
Figure 6.1. A typical child in this analysis is defined as a CDS child who has the
median on each control variable and -9 as his or her fixed term. The fixed term is the
median value of the estimated individual heterogeneity taken from the first imputed
dataset. The solid line represents the predicted number of school days missed using
the log-transformed net worth; the predicted number of days reduces from 1.7 to 1.5
when net worth becomes positive. Missed school days as predicted from the
categorical measure (the dot line) is very small (less than .5), and the negative
category clearly has higher predicted numbers than all the other categories. It is worth
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noting that the figures shown in this chapter are not directly comparable to those in
Chapter 5 because the typical case varies and the fixed term is arbitrary.
Figure 6.2 plots the predicted number of school days missed using liquid asset
measures (see Table 6.6 for detailed results); it has a different pattern from Figure 6.1.
First, as shown by the solid line, the continuous measure has a positive association
with the number of school days missed (b=.03, p<.01), although its impact seems
relatively small. For the categorical measure, the zero-liquid-asset group has the
smallest number of school days missed, and the predicted number decreases when
liquid assets fall into the highest category.
Another important predictor is homeownership. Children of renters have the
number of school days missed 1.2 times higher than that of children of homeowners
(p<.1). This is consistent with the results of net worth measures (see Figure 6.1) given
that home equity is generally a household’s most important asset. Homeownership
may affect children’s health in a way different from that of liquid assets. For example,
homeowners’ children may be less likely to be sick than children of renters. However,
if children have physical illness, households with liquid assets may be more likely to
take children from school for health services.
6.3.3 Hospitalization (Count Variable)
FIGURE 6.3 ABOUT HERE

Figure 6.3 displays the predicted frequency of hospitalization for a typical
child with a fixed term of -.6. The negative coefficient of the log-transformed net
worth (b=-.04, p<.01) mainly reflects the difference in hospitalization between those
with positive and negative net worth. Using the typical case as an example, children
with positive net worth have .49 times of hospitalization, 17% lower than those with
negative net worth (.57). The relationship between net worth and children’s
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hospitalization is not linear and clear-cut if net worth is measured by a four-category
variable. In Table 6.6, children with disabilities stay in hospital less frequently if
households have their own homes. Their frequency of hospitalization is only 80% of
those in households not owning a home. Liquid assets, however, do not have the
expected negative association with hospitalization.
6.3.4 Doctor Visits for Illness (Count Variable)
The analyses estimate a positive coefficient (b=.09, p<.01) for the net worth
category of $10,001-$40,000, indicating that children’s doctor visits for illness may
increase when net worth increases from the reference category of $0-$10,000 to the
next category. A negative coefficient (b=-.06, p<.1) is generated for the category of
$40,000 and above, suggesting fewer doctor visits for children in the highest net
worth category. Results for liquid assets follow a similar pattern, in which children of
households in the highest liquid asset category (above $10,000) are less likely to visit
doctors for illness. In addition, children of homeowners visit doctor 16% more
frequently than those of non-homeowners.
6.3.5 Doctor Visits for Emotional Problems (Dichotomous Variable)
The most interesting finding about this outcome is that net worth increases
children’s likelihood to visit a professional for their mental, emotional, or behavioral
problems. A 100% increase in net worth raises the odds of doctor visits for emotional
problems by 5%. The odds ratios of the reference net worth category and the two
higher categories are .71 (b=-.34, p<.01) and .26 (b=-1.34, p<.01), respectively. When
parenting behavior variables are not included in the model, children in zero-liquidasset households are more likely to have doctor visits for emotional problems than
children in the other two liquid asset categories: $1-$1,000 (b=-.28, p<.05) and above
$10,000 (b=-.48, p<.01). The statistical significance of categorical liquid asset
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variables disappears with the addition of parenting behavior variables.
6.4. Results of SEM Analyses
The fourth empirical strategy further tests asset effects on educational and
health outcomes for children with disabilities using the three-wave longitudinal data
in Structural Equations Models (SEMs). As a possible solution to the endogeneity
issue in fixed-effects analyses, it may better capture the dynamic relationships
between household assets and child outcomes. For each outcome measure, two
models are conducted on the same sample used for fixed-effects analyses. The first
model (SEM1) adds an individual heterogeneous term (similar to fixed-effects
analyses) and correlates household assets with the error term of dependent variables at
the previous stage. The second model specification (SEM2) does not have the
individual heterogeneous term in analyses. Instead, SEM2 assumes a dynamic
relationship between children’s outcomes over time and includes the first-order lag of
the dependent variable in analyses. Appendix B provides detailed information of these
two models.
6.4.1. Net Worth and Child Outcomes
TABLE 6.7 ABOUT HERE

Results of net worth are summarized in Tables 6.7. I do not report model fit
indices for these analyses because the study is mainly interested in the regression
coefficients of asset measures. 21 Results from SEM1 are reported in the first column,
and those from SEM2 are in the second column. Each row represents a separate
analysis for the continuous or categorical net worth measure. For example, for

21 As expected, the model fit indices are poor in these analyses for two reasons: On
the one hand, the “measurement” model to estimate a fixed-effect term in SEM1 is
not a true “measurement” model. On the other hand, many factors that may affect
child well-being are not included in these analyses.
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children’s applied problems scores, the estimated regression coefficients of logtransformed net worth at the three waves in SEM1 are .04, -.13, and -.23, respectively.
The table looks complicated as SEM analyses allow asset effects to vary in the three
waves.
First, net worth has expected positive effects on all education outcomes. For
the two WJ-R test scores (applied problems and broad reading scores), asset effects
are mainly reflected by the score difference between the highest net worth category
and the other categories. Roughly, the former has a score three points higher than the
other categories (p<.05), especially in CDS Waves II and III. Fixed-effects analyses in
Table 6.3, however, do not find significant associations between net worth and
children’s cognitive scores. This result may be caused by the assumption in fixedeffects analyses that asset effects are homogeneous at different observational points.
Second, children in the highest net worth category (>40,000) have a lower probability
of repeating a grade at the second wave in SEM1. The results are not directly
comparable with those from fixed-effects analyses because regression models are
different (Probit vs. conditional Logit). Third, log-transformed net worth has a
negative association with children’s experiences of school suspension or expulsion
(b=-.03, p<.05).
Two regression coefficients have directions opposite from the hypothesis of
asset effects. In SEM1, the negative net worth category has higher broad reading
scores (b=2.5, p<.1) than the reference category ($0-$10,000) at the second wave, and
the category of $10,001-$40,000 has a higher probability of repeating a grade than the
category of $0-$10,000.
SEM analyses and fixed-effects analyses generate similar findings regarding
the positive association between net worth and children’s global health status. As a
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note to this, the significant association is found only in the two highest categories at
the first wave. Technically, this finding should be explained with caution because, due
to the data limitation, the correlation between asset measures at the first wave and the
error term of outcome measures at the previous stage cannot be specified. In other
words, there is a possibility of overestimation regarding the results of asset measures
at the first wave.
SEM1 does not find net worth to be significantly associated with the other
health outcomes. The dynamic models (SEM2) indicate that (1) the highest net worth
category has a higher propensity of missing school due to physical illness at the
second wave; (2) the log-transformed net worth reduces children’s occurrence of
hospitalization at the third wave; and (3) net worth is positively linked to children’s
likelihood of visiting professionals for emotional and behavioral problems at the first
wave. Overall, these results confirm the findings from fixed-effects analyses.
6.4.2 Liquid Assets and Child Outcomes
TABLE 6.8 ABOUT HERE

Table 6.8 reports the results of SEM analyses of liquid assets and child
outcomes. Findings regarding liquid assets are comparable to those on net worth
except for two minor differences. First, liquid assets are not associated with children’s
experiences of repeating a grade. Second, both measures of liquid asset (continuous
and categorical) are related to children’s doctor visits for illness. For example, at the
first wave, households with more assets are more likely to have children visit doctors
for physical illness.
6.5 Summary
The results of fixed-effects analyses mostly agree with those reported in the
last two chapters and partially support the hypothesis of asset effects for children (see
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Table 6.1). Household net worth and liquid assets appear to reduce children’s
probabilities of repeating a grade and being suspended from the school. Households
are more likely to report children having excellent health if they have more net worth.
In addition, with more net worth, children have fewer school days missed due to
illness and experience hospitalization less frequently.
One explanation for the disagreement between net worth and liquid assets is
asset allocation. Different types of assets may affect child development in various
ways. Another possible explanation is that some health outcome measures are related
to health service utilization (i.e., hospitalization and doctor visits). Health service
utilization, as expected, may be affected by household assets in different ways
because household assets can provide financial resources for health services or help
avoid negative health conditions, thereby reducing the need for health services.
Findings regarding indicators of parenting behavior are quite expected. It is
interesting that parents’ educational expectations are highly correlated with health
outcomes. On one hand, parents’ educational expectations may reflect their general
expectations for their children beyond education. On the other hand, this association
could imply a reverse association between health outcomes and parents’ educational
expectations. Finally, it is important to note that fixed-effects analyses on categorical
outcome measures are conditional models, which have excluded all children lacking
variation within the dependent variable. These results may not be generalizable for the
entire population of interest. Finally, the SEM tests of the fourth strategy generate the
results essentially consistent with those from the fixed-effects models.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion: Discussion and Implication
This chapter summarizes the main findings on asset effects and other variables
(e.g., parenting behavior variables, disability, and household income), and then
discusses research and policy implications of these findings.
7.1 Discussion
7.1.1 The Hypothesis of Asset Effects
The study examines asset effects for children with disabilities on nine child
outcomes using four different strategies and four asset measures. The question is
whether there is any conclusive evidence to support this hypothesis. Theoretical and
policy implications would be clear and simple if there is perfect evidence – that is,
household assets have expected, statistically significant, and homogenous marginal
effects regardless of the differences in outcome measures, asset measures, and
statistical strategies for model testing. The real results, however, seem much more
complicated. There are several themes in the observations (see Table 7.1). First,
several health outcome measures have statistical associations with household assets,
and this finding is consistent in all four strategies. Second, the categorical measures of
household assets seem to show asset effects better. Third, household assets may affect
children’s health service utilization in various ways.
TABLE 7.1 ABOUT HERE

Asset Effects by Child Outcomes. All the child outcomes under examination
have statistically significant associations with household assets in one or more tests.
Consistent in the four testing strategies, children’s global health status, school days
missed due to physical illness, and hospitalization are correlated with household
assets.
The findings provide insights into the pattern of asset effects. To use
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children’s global health as an example, Table 7.2 summarizes Probit regression results
on this outcome measure in the first, second, and fourth strategies. Fixed-effects
analysis is not included because it uses conditional Logit model, and includes only
children who have within-person variation on global health status. This table shows a
decreasing trend regarding the magnitude of regression coefficients from assets
measured before childbirth to current assets. For liquid assets, $1,000 is the threshold
value for this type of assets to generate statistically significant and positive impact on
children’s global health in the first strategy, but in the fourth strategy, the threshold
value of liquid assets has to increase to $10,000 for the significant results to be
detected. It indicates that household assets before childbirth or in early stages of
childhood have greater influences on children’s global health than those at a later
stage.
TABLES 7.2 AND 7.3 ABOUT HERE

Such tables can also be created for other health outcome measures, such as
school days missed due to physical illness and hospitalization. Table 7.3 shows a
different pattern of asset effects on school days missed. The number of school days
missed decreases when household assets (measured before childbirth) increase, and
the asset threshold to show this association is $10,000. In SEM analyses, when the
asset measures in a later stage of childhood are used, the direction of the association
between household assets and school days missed changes, perhaps because
household assets before childbirth contribute to a lower probability of physical illness
later on (preventive effects) and further reduce the number of school days missed. But
asset measures in a later stage of childhood indicate household economic resources
for providing services and support for children who are sick.
Household assets also have significant associations with three outcome
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measures—children’s experience of repeating a grade, school suspension or expulsion,
and doctor visits for physical illness—in all strategies except for propensity score
classification. A closer examination of the results, however, suggests that the
associations of household assets with repeating a grade and school suspension or
expulsion are relatively weak and unstable (see Tables 5.3 and 5.4). Only fixedeffects analyses of children who had repeated a grade at least once show a strong
association between household assets and repeating a grade. Doctor visits for illness,
as an outcome measure, shows a pattern similar to school days missed due to illness in
terms of its association with household assets, mostly because both measures are
related to children’s physical illness.
Children’s cognitive ability (or academic achievement), measured by two WJR test scores, is positively related to household assets in the first strategy and the
fourth strategy (SEM2 only). The insignificance of household assets in propensity
score classification may suggest that children’s cognitive ability and household assets
are both confounded with parental characteristics (such as education and parents’
cognitive ability). On the other hand, the insignificance of household assets in fixedeffects analyses and SEM1 of the fourth strategy may indicate that children’s
cognitive ability is relatively stable. There is not much within-person variation in
these outcome measures after taking account of individual heterogeneity as indicated
by the fixed term in fixed-effects analyses.
Children’s doctor visits for emotional problems show a positive association
with household assets in the third and fourth strategies using assets measured in a later
stage of childhood. This is similar to the findings on school days missed and doctor
visits for illness in the same sets of analyses, implying a positive association between
household assets and health service utilization. To sum up, these findings suggest
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evidence for the hypothesis of asset effects on children’s health outcomes. Among the
educational outcomes examined, children’s cognitive ability is less likely than school
attainment to be affected by household assets.
Asset Effects by Asset Types. While the PSID data provide household asset
information on multiple asset types, it is not feasible to examine all of them in a single
study. The current study focuses on household net worth and liquid assets. As
discussed in the last section, findings on children’s health outcomes seem to be more
consistent across different empirical strategies than educational outcomes, and,
therefore, the findings on health outcomes are used to examine asset effects by asset
types. In addition, both net worth and liquid assets have the same scale ($), which
makes it possible to directly compare their results. There seems a pattern, especially
in the first set of analyses, that the regression coefficients of liquid assets are greater
than those of net worth. In other words, liquid assets have larger associations with
children’s health outcomes than net worth. For example, the regression coefficient of
the highest liquid asset category (above $10,000) on children’s global health is .69,
but the coefficient of the net worth category of $10,001-$40,000 is only .33 (see Table
7.2). To identify the varying effects by asset types adds to our understanding of the
mechanism of asset effects.
Nonlinear Distribution of Asset Effects. The distribution of asset effects on
child outcomes is nonlinear. It is the categorical asset measures (as opposed to the
continuous measures) for which statistically significant associations are more often
found. The log-transformed net worth, for example, does not predict children’s global
health in the first and fourth strategies, while the categorical one does. The nonlinear
nature of asset effects is not surprising. However, several issues need to be addressed
in order to estimate nonlinear asset effects.
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First, can nonlinear asset effects be theorized? Chapter 5 illustrates different
nonlinear asset effects (e.g., the U-shape and the N-shape), all of which are empirical
estimation from the study sample. Some of these findings are puzzling and need to be
examined further. The pure empirical investigation of nonlinear asset effects may be
subject to mistakes caused by model misspecification, measurement errors, sampling
variation, and arbitrary choices of asset categories. Therefore, theorization of
nonlinear asset effects (if any) is needed in the future.
Second, a direct implication of nonlinear asset effects is to help us identify a
threshold for household assets to generate positive effects on child development. In
the first strategy, children living in households with net worth greater than $10,000
have better global health, and are less likely to miss school or visit doctors. But the
net worth value has to increase to the level of $40,000 or more to significantly reduce
the probability of hospitalization. The threshold for liquid assets to have positive
effects is relatively low (see Table 5.7 for details). This is expected because
households’ net worth value generally is higher than their liquid asset value. Based on
the results presented in the last two chapters, it seems reasonable to tentatively
propose some asset thresholds: that is, a net worth value of $40,000 and a liquid asset
value of $10,000. This may provide a guideline for household saving behaviors.
Third, given the nonlinear nature of asset effects, it seems that to take a
logarithm of asset values, a conventional approach to highly skewed asset measures,
may not be a good practice in testing asset effects. Specifically, there are two issues
with regard to log-transformed continuous asset measures: (1) To estimate nonlinear
asset effects using only one slope parameter is rather limited and can be misleading as
well. For example, regarding children’s applied problems scores (see Figure 5.1), the
slope of log-transformed net worth is almost zero because the estimation tends to

73

balance the two high ends of a U-shape asset effect. In contrast, the log-transformed
net worth is statistically significant in the model of children’s school suspension due
to an L-shape asset effect (see Figure 5.4). (2) Asset effects may be overestimated by
using the log-transformed asset measures. In order to create log-transformed values,
all negative asset values have to be clustered at the value of zero. This may create an
artificially steep slope (see Figure 5.8, 5.10, and 5.12 for the Z-shape solid lines; all
show a steep slope at the asset value zero). A simulated case in Figure 7.1 also
illustrates the possibility of overestimation. Suppose the solid line shows a true slope
of -.1 between net worth and the outcome measure in the net worth range of (-$30,000,
$0). As displayed in the dash-dot line, when all negative net worth values are
clustered at zero, the slope becomes 1.
FIGURE 7.1 ABOUT HERE

Finally, the estimated nonlinear effects may imply serious measurement errors
in asset measures. It is suspected that households with negative net worth and those
with zero liquid assets may have reporting errors in these two measures. For example,
in the first set of analyses, these two groups show better educational outcomes than
the other groups with higher net worth or liquid assets. One explanation is that
households with negative net worth have access to the credit market and therefore
may have more economic resources in the short term. Another possible explanation is
that measurement errors (in asset measures) for these households may have interfered
with the estimation of true asset effects.
Size of Asset Effects. As discussed above, household assets have statistically
positive effects for children with disabilities, especially on health outcomes. From a
policy perspective, it is also important to ask whether these asset effects are
practically meaningful. Chapters 5 and 6 have discussions of marginal asset effects
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and the practical meaning of asset effects based on the first and third strategies. The
following two examples suggest that household asset accumulation can contribute to
child development. First, an increase in household net worth from $0 to $40,000 in
early childhood can close the gap in math and reading scores between those who have
finished high school and those who have not. Second, for a typical child, an increase
of household net worth from $10,000 to $40,000 can raise the probability of having
excellent health by 10%.
Asset Effects for Sub-groups. The second strategy, propensity score
classification, provides an opportunity to examine asset effects for multiple subgroups. With propensity score classification, households are categorized into three
groups based on their expected asset values. Those with low-expected asset values
may have actually accumulated assets higher than expected. Similarly, those with
high-expected asset values may have saved only a small amount of assets. The
difference between the expected and actual values allows the study to examine
different asset effects for the low-expected and high-expected asset groups. As
discussed in Chapter 5, asset effects for the group with low-expected asset values are
greater than those for the group with high-expected values (see Table 5.10). From a
policy perspective, this may imply that it is efficient for asset-based programs to
target low-income and low-wealth households.
Fixed-effects analyses for categorical outcome measures in the third strategy
are conditional models, which only include children whose outcome measures show
within-person variation. For example, children who did not repeat a grade in any
wave are excluded from analyses. To some extent, this can be considered an analysis
of sub-groups. Asset effects appear to be greater for children who are included in
fixed-effects analyses. For instance, for liquid assets to have a positive impact on
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educational outcomes indicated by repeating a grade, the threshold is as low as $1,000.
Cumulative Asset Effects and Asset Effect Patterns. In Chapter 4, the study
proposes the hypothesis of cumulative asset effects for model testing. That is, current
child outcome is determined not only by current household assets but also by those at
previous stages. This idea leads to three testable research questions.
The first question is, “What is the pattern of asset effects by child’s age?”
Possible patterns have been discussed in Chapter 4 (e.g., the increasing or decreasing
pattern of asset effects by age). It is important to note that patterns of asset effects by
age are different from the nonlinearity of asset effects discussed above. The former
refers to asset effects associated with age or development stages of individual children.
The latter is a general distribution of asset effects in the population. Although this
study is not intended to test the pattern of asset effects by child’s age directly, the use
of asset measures at different ages among these strategies and a comparison of the
results, can, to some extent, provide insights into this question. For example, the
discussion above suggests that household assets play a more important role in early
childhood (i.e., a decreasing pattern) than later.
The second question is to estimate average asset effects over childhood while
ignoring the asset effect patterns. The first two strategies can be considered example
analyses to test this question because they use asset measures at one time period to be
a proxy of all household assets invested in child development in childhood.
The third question is to examine the unique effects of household assets
measured at a specific time point. For instance, researchers may be interested in asset
effects when children reach age six conditional on previous cumulative asset effects.
The third and fourth strategies may tackle this question since the individual fixed-term
in fixed-effects analyses or the lagged outcome measures in SEM2 can be considered
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an indicator of cumulative asset effects in previous stages.
7.1.2 Mediation Mechanism and Parenting Behavior Variables
The second aim of the study is to examine whether asset effects for children
with disabilities are mediated through parenting behaviors. It is hypothesized that
asset accumulation and asset holding affect parents’ engagement and investment in
child development and further change child outcomes. To test this hypothesis,
parenting behavior variables—including parental involvement, parental warmth,
parenting stress, and parents’ educational expectations—are added in Models 3 and 5
of the first strategy (see Table 5.3) and Longitudinal Model 3 (LM3) of the third
strategy (see Table 6.3). If the mediation mechanism exists, then to include parenting
behavior variables will reduce the correlation between household assets and outcome
measures. In addition, these parenting behavior variables should have a direct
association with child outcomes.
This mediation hypothesis is not supported because the addition of parenting
behavior variables in the model does not change the estimated asset effects in most of
cases. Therefore, parenting behavior variables are not used in the second and fourth
strategies. Models with parenting behavior variables actually suggest that, for
households with the same level of parental involvement, the more assets households
own, the better children develop. The question remains as to how household assets
affect child well-being. In the future, there is a need to look into how household assets
are associated with physical environment, such as home, school, and community.
TABLE 7.4 ABOUT HERE

Table 7.4 summarizes the relationships between parenting behavior variables
and child outcomes. There are two main findings. One is that parental involvement
and parents’ educational expectations promote child development and improve child
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well-being. Parental involvement and parents’ educational expectations are positively
related to children’s test scores and negatively related to children’s probability of
repeating a grade and school suspensions. Second, parental warmth and parenting
stress could be affected by child development. For instance, some health utilization
variables (such as hospitalization and doctor visits for illness or emotional problems)
are positively associated with parental warmth and parenting stress, possibly because
children’s health conditions and service utilization change the level of parental
warmth and parenting stress. Another explanation on the positive association between
health services and parental warmth could be that parental warmth may increase
parents’ sensitivity to children’s health and health service needs.
7.1.3 Child Characteristics
This section briefly discusses the results of child characteristics, with a focus
on the first set of analyses. One of the child characteristics is child disability.
Children’s disability status is a control variable in analyses. A measure indicating
whether a child has a disability in a specific CDS wave is included in all analyses. In
addition, disability types are also considered and added in the first and second
strategies.
Findings regarding children’s disability types are expected. Detailed results
from the first strategy can be requested from the author of the dissertation. In
summary, those with hearing difficulty or autism have lower WJ-R test scores;22
children having visual difficulty or orthopedic impairment are less likely to repeat a
grade; and those with learning disability or ADHD have a higher probability of school
suspension. It is also found that children with autism have worse health (indicated by

22 I also conduct a robustness test excluding children with autism and emotional
disturbance from the analyses of educational outcomes. Results of the robustness test
are similar to those reported in Chapter 5.
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global health status, hospitalization and doctor visits for illness). In addition,
children’s emotional disturbance is associated with school days missed, doctor visits
for illness, and doctor visits for emotional problems.
The timing of disability also matters. As shown in Table 7.4, having a
disability in either CDS Wave I or Wave II is always associated with poor child
outcomes except for school suspension or expulsion. Having a disability is related to a
lower probability of being suspended or expelled from the school. But the relationship
between poor outcomes and having a disability in CDS Wave II is more likely to be
statistically significant because child outcomes in the first set of analyses are
measured at Wave II. In the fixed-effects analyses, the timing of disability variable
actually indicates the change of disability status from the previous wave. Focusing on
within-person comparison, therefore, the fixed-effects analyses show how the change
of disability status (from non-disability to disability) affects child outcomes. Not
surprisingly, the transition to disability is highly related to poor child outcomes. The
transition to disability also substantially increases health service utilization.
Another child characteristic is special education status. In the first set of
analyses, children who are in special education programs at Wave II have poor
outcomes on all dependent measures except for hospitalization and doctor visits for
physical illness.
In the first set of analyses, compared to female children, male children have
higher applied problems scores, are more likely to be suspended from school, and
have fewer doctor visits for physical illness. Black children have lower test scores and
a higher probability of school suspension or expulsion than white children.
The analyses also control for child’s age and age-squared. The regression
coefficients of these two variables always have opposite directions. Child’s age is
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positively related to the applied problems score, the likelihood of repeating a grade,
number of school days missed, and doctor visits for emotional problems, but is
negatively associated with the other child outcomes. The use of the categorical
measure of child’s age in sensitivity tests produces similar results.
7.1.4 Household Income
Reported in Chapter 5, household income before childbirth is positively
related to children’s applied problems scores alone. It does not correlate with any
health outcome measures after controlling for child and household characteristics. In
fixed-effects analyses, household income is not statistically significant for all outcome
measures except children’s repeating a grade and doctor visits for emotional problems.
Three general issues about household income in testing the hypothesis of asset effects
are discussed below.
First, the insignificance of household income, to some extent, increases our
confidence in the estimated asset effects. As economic resources, both household
income and assets may share similar confounders (i.e., employment, education, family
background, and so on) when predicting child outcomes. If the estimated asset effects
are biased due to the confoundedness, this problem may occur with household income
as well. Given the distinct results on household income and assets, it seems the
common confounders have been appropriately addressed.
Second, it is important to consider how to control for other household
economic resources (such as income) in analyses. Research on asset effects tries to
identify the unique role of household assets different from household income. The
conventional approach to add household income as a control variable, however, may
not be able to distinguish asset effects additive to income effects (quantitative
difference) and those effects unique to household assets (qualitative difference). In
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fact, this strategy examines whether children from households with more assets have
better child outcomes given the same level of household income. In other words,
instead of testing the qualitative difference of household assets from income, this
strategy actually tests whether more economic resources are associated with better
child outcomes.
The study does not intend to address this issue, but it can possibly be done by
including two indicators of household economic resources in analysis: One is the total
amount of household economic resources (that is, the sum of household assets and
income), and the other is the ratio of household assets and household income. To
control for the total amount of economic resources means that the analysis compares
households with an equal amount of economic resources. Under this circumstance, if
the ratio variable has a positive influence on child outcomes, it indicates that assets
have effects different from household income (qualitative difference).
Third, what income measure should be used? The current study and previous
research use the mean of household income in several years as a proxy of household
permanent income because it is less fluctuant than annual income. Household
permanent income is a good measure of long-term economic resources. According to
the classical theories of savings, such as the Life-Cycle Hypothesis and the buffershock model (Nam et al., 2008), household assets are accumulated for consumption
smoothing during income fluctuations, and extra income is saved when households
have income more than needed for consumption. From this view, it is perhaps better
to have a direct measure of income fluctuation.
For example, suppose two households have the same level of permanent
income. One experiences a short-term negative income shock and the other does not.
The one with negative income shock maintains the same level of consumption by
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spending down household savings. If household permanent income is controlled for,
the effects of household assets on consumption smoothing are less likely to be
detected because the analysis would compare the level of consumption for households
with the same level of permanent income. A better approach is to create an income
fluctuation indicator using both household permanent income and annual income.
Finally, beyond the technical issues about household income discussed above,
it is also important to clearly distinguish stocks (assets) and flows (income)
conceptually. The theoretical relationship between assets and income is complicated
and assets and income cannot be independent of each other by definitions. Assets are
the difference between income and consumption, and asset stocks can generate
income flows as well. This perspective suggests that it may not be sufficient to control
for income in regression analysis.
7.2 Limitations and Research Implications
There are several limitations in this exploratory study of asset effects for
children with disabilities. These limitations should be addressed in the future. First,
the theory of asset effects for children has not been adequately specified. The
empirical examination in the study is “reduced-form” tests and is exploratory in
nature.
As summarized in Chapter 2, possible effects of household assets on child
development and child well-being are discussed in several studies (e.g., Lerman &
McKernan, 2008; Nam & Huang, 2009; Shanks et al., 2009), which examine the
direction (positive vs. negative) and mechanism of asset effects. It is believed that
household assets affect child development through improving home environment,
parenting behaviors, and family functioning. Some studies also discuss potential
heterogeneity of asset effects across different populations. Valuable as they are, these
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studies do not provide specific guidelines to examine asset effects. For example, it
would be less meaningful to predict the direction of asset effects (i.e., positive or
negative) if asset effects are in fact nonlinear. The findings on the mediation
mechanism are mixed. Some studies (e.g., Kim, 2010), including this one, do not find
strong empirical support for it.
Built on previous theoretical discussions, the study defines asset effects from
the life course perspective and considers asset effects cumulative during childhood.
There are several key questions from this view: (1) What is the pattern of asset effects
by child’s age or by stages of child development? The answer to this question helps
determine the best timing when asset-based intervention is applied to facilitate child
development. It also helps identify the average asset effects over childhood or asset
effects at a specific stage. The current study has some preliminary evidence that
household assets in early childhood are more important for children’s health outcomes
than those in a later stage. (2) What is the distribution of asset effects in the
population? This question helps theorize the nonlinear nature of asset effects.
Practically, it is an effort to establish the asset threshold value at which household
assets can generate positive impact on child development. (3) How to model
heterogeneity of asset effects? Heterogeneity refers to varying asset effects by
outcome measures, asset measures, and sub-populations. Two types of research—
descriptive (exploratory) or confirmative—can be conducted on these key questions.
Exploratory investigation is used to summarize descriptive findings from the existing
data and build specific and theoretical hypotheses. Then confirmative studies can be
developed to test these hypotheses.
Second, the study is focused on children with disabilities, and, as a key
variable, disability indicated by disability types, and the transition from non-disability
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to disability is closely examined. But interactions between disability characteristics
and household assets are not closely looked at. Such interactions can be defined from
two dimensions—asset effects for children with and without disabilities and for
children with different types of disabilities. Children with different disability types
have different development trajectories; multilevel analyses may be used in the
research to address the heterogeneity of asset effects across disability types. This topic
is left for future research.
Third, asset effects for children with disabilities, if any, occur in a complex
social and policy context. Asset effects for children with disabilities should be
evaluated in a policy context. For example, the public education system may have a
role in the association of household assets and child educational outcomes.
Educational policy and school system may produce “noises” in the evaluation of asset
effects for children with disabilities. For example, the No Child Left Behind policy
may significantly change educational practices on special education in schools.
School districts with fiscal pressures may tighten their special education eligibility.
Different types of schools—typical public schools, Charter schools, and private
schools—may reflect selection bias. In addition, children with disabilities may access
more services if parents were able to communicate and negotiate with school.
Health service delivery can also moderate asset effects on child health
outcomes. For low-income households, public assistance, asset accumulation, and
child development are all intertwined. For instance, low-income children receiving
public health programs (e.g., Medicaid and State Children’s Health Insurance
Program) may have better health or health services than those with income slightly
higher than the poverty line and not eligible for public programs. The means-tested
eligibility of these programs is likely to change parents’ saving behavior. High levels
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of public services may reduce the need for private financial resources. For instance,
states have different asset limit eligibility rules for State Children Health Insurance
Program; it is important to examine different asset effects on health outcomes among
states with various asset limits. Future research should examine the social and policy
context of asset effects for children with disabilities.
Fourth, household asset measures likely have measurement errors, although
the PSID provides high quality data. There are some puzzling results in the study,
especially on those with negative net worth or zero liquid assets. These results may be
related to the measurement errors of household assets. This limitation is not
uncommon in self-reported survey data. Future research can address it by collecting
accurate data or modeling measurement errors. For example, household asset
information collected by the IRS or banking institutions is reliable and may be
considered for this type of study. Another thought is to build a theoretical model of
measurement errors (measurement model) and apply appropriate statistical analyses
(such as confirmatory factor analysis or item response model) for model testing.
Fifth, the hypothesis of asset effects assumes causality between household
assets and child development. Even when all limitations above are addressed, it is still
difficult, if not impossible, to test causality using observational data because child
development is a complex process affected by multiple systems and their interactions
(such as disability, school, and health policy discussed above). The reduced-form
analyses used in the dissertation are likely to have bias due to not considering these
dynamics. It raises a concern regarding the extent to which the analyses accurately
estimate asset effects on child outcomes. On one hand, programs with experimental
design will be especially useful in this regard. On the other hand, it is important to use
a structural approach for clear specification of these dynamics in the conceptual
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model (Pearl, 2000). If the study claims that asset effects vary by disability types or
policy contexts, these hypotheses should be included in the conceptual model
appropriately.
Finally, there is still ample room for technical improvement. For instance, it
may be better to model children’s experiences of repeating a grade and school
suspension or expulsion using event-history analysis. Other methods or estimators
(i.e., Generalized Method of Moments) can also be considered upon the availability of
panel data with more than three waves.
7.3 Policy Implications
The study finds that household assets have positive effects for children with
disabilities, especially on health outcomes. In this sample, asset effects generally
emerge when household net worth is greater than $40,000 or liquid assets are greater
than $10,000. Although the findings suggest that household assets in early childhood
are more important for child well-being than those at a later stage, the positive
association between household assets and child outcomes exists in both periods, with
the mechanism of assets varying at different stages. This indicates the importance of
having assets throughout childhood. The study also shows that marginal asset effects
are greater in low-income and low-wealth households. These findings not only have
implications for asset-based policies for children with disabilities and their families,
but also provide an empirical justification for the policy proposals mentioned in
Chapter 1. For example, since household assets have effects throughout childhood,
Child Development Accounts (CDAs), which encourage households to save for their
children from childbirth, appear a good asset-building policy option for all children,
including those with disabilities. Other policy options mentioned at the beginning of
the dissertation, such as Disability Savings Accounts or Individual Development
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Accounts (IDAs) for youth with disabilities, are also useful for specific saving
purposes or populations (e.g., children receiving Supplemental Security Income). This
study further argues that asset building should be considered a policy strategy for the
successful development of children with disabilities.
Current US disability policies and programs are faced with the challenges of
financial sustainability and high poverty and unemployment rates among people with
disabilities. Disability policy is under radical modification to have a greater focus on
health and human capital, successful transition to adulthood, and economic
independence for children with disabilities. The findings of the study suggest that
asset building should be a necessary component in this new vision. Although
household assets have been included in the new picture of policy development (see
the policy proposals in Chapter 1), their role has not been clearly defined yet. From
my view, asset building, education and training, health services, and social
engagement and inclusion are the four most important strategies to achieve this new
vision for children with disabilities, and these strategies should be adopted throughout
the entire disability policy system. For this population, economic resources, including
household assets, are the foundation for successful child development and
accumulation of health and human capital, as well as a key determinant of future
economic independence. Asset building can even be a facilitator of the other three
strategies mentioned above. More research in this area is needed to help clarify the
role of household assets in this new vision.
The first step to achieve this new vision of asset building for children with
disabilities is to summarize existing knowledge and lessons. The current study
provides a brief review of the work in this area (see Chapter 2). Admittedly, such
research is especially rare when it comes to children with disabilities. A systematic
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review of existing knowledge and lessons is imperative, especially in the following
aspects: (1) theories of disability and development and how to relate them to asset
building; (2) the well-being of children with disabilities as indicated by poverty,
assets, and educational and health outcomes; (3) an assessment of current disability
programs and services for children and their relevance to asset building; and (4) a
review of existing asset building strategies for the general population.
Summarized knowledge and lessons should be applied to test asset building
for children with disabilities in practice. Policy innovations can include but are not
limited to the following ideas: (1) developing new operations in existing programs to
accommodate asset building goals; and (2) creating new programs to encourage asset
accumulation. Examples of new operations in existing programs are Individual
Development Accounts (IDAs) for children with disabilities in the SSI program, the
inclusion of financial education and financial services in the Individualized Education
Plan for children with disabilities, and more generous tax benefits for flexible
spending accounts for disabled children. An example of new programs is Child
Savings Accounts (CSAs) discussed in Chapter 1.
Several findings of the study are useful for designing asset-based policy
innovations for children with disabilities. First, asset-based programs should start
early and last long. The study suggests that household assets before childbirth have a
positive impact on children’s health outcomes by preventing the occurrence of
negative health conditions. It may be appropriate to use asset-based programs to foster
parents’ savings for all children even at the prenatal stage. The program should be
universal and inclusive since the risk of having a disability always exists. The
purposes of asset accumulation may be adjusted later if children are diagnosed with a
disability. The study also finds positive associations between children’s health
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outcomes and household assets in later childhood. This lends support for asset-based
programs that encourage a continuous process of asset accumulation lasting
throughout and even beyond childhood.
Second, asset-based programs should mainly target health outcomes for
children with disabilities because they have a high level of unmet health needs. The
findings of asset effects on health outcomes for children with disabilities are
consistent across four different empirical strategies. Current asset-based programs for
children, such as Educational Savings Accounts and 529 Plans, generally focus on
education. Ideally, asset-based programs for children should have an array of savings’
purposes broader than education and match the child’s developmental goals. In this
regard, Child Savings Accounts (CSAs) seem a better design. For children with
disabilities, saving for health should be emphasized in particular.
Third, household assets affect individual well-being through both asset
spending (consumption) and asset holding. These two may seem conflicting because
holding assets may limit the use of assets. The different findings of asset effects on
health service utilization (e.g., doctor visits for physical illness) between the first and
fourth set of analyses are a reflection of these two mechanisms. Therefore, asset-based
programs should create a structure that allows program participants to benefit from
both types of asset effects. For example, such programs may set up a minimum
savings amount for long-term goals and any savings beyond this amount can be spent
for restricted purposes, such as health and education.
Fourth, the minimum savings amount of asset-based programs for children
with disabilities should be set at around $10,000, and these programs should help
families achieve this goal as early as possible. As indicated by this study, asset effects
are more likely to seen when households have liquid assets greater than $10,000.
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Apparently, this goal can be challenging for some families because the median value
of household liquid assets in the sample is $2,000. The minimum savings goal could
be lower because perhaps liquid assets examined in this study are not entirely
intended for children with disabilities. Further research is needed to see how much
savings families truly spend on children with disabilities. An alternative is that the
government provide a large amount of seed funds (e.g., $5,000), or families can
“borrow” without interest for savings in asset-based programs from the government or
the market.
Finally, asset-based programs should be progressive toward low-income and
low-wealth populations. The study finds that household assets have greater marginal
effects for low-income and low-wealth households than for high-income and highwealth households. Disadvantaged populations benefit more from asset ownership.
Progressive asset-based programs are both efficient and equitable. To achieve
progressiveness, appropriate financial incentives can be provided for disadvantaged
populations. Asset-based programs may provide a higher match savings rate, larger
match savings amount, or more seed funds for low-income participants than for
typical program participants. To achieve equity, The distribution of government
expenditures should be reconsidered and redirected given that the current asset-based
policies are administered largely through the tax code and lean toward the wealthy,
while low-income households benefit little from these policies because these
households have a low marginal tax rate, do not itemize deductions, or do not accrue
much tax liability. In addition, new asset-based programs should expand access to
financial services and improve the financial capability of disadvantaged populations.
7.4 Conclusion
The study tests the hypothesis of asset effects on educational and health
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outcomes for children with disabilities using the PSID-CDS longitudinal data.
Household assets are found to have consistent and positive effects on major health
outcome measures in all empirical strategies, and, in some analyses, positive effects
on children’s educational achievement. Asset effects generally emerge when
household net worth is greater than $40,000 or liquid assets are greater than $10,000.
Although household assets in early childhood are more important for child well-being
than those at a later stage, positive associations between household assets and child
outcomes exist in both periods. This indicates the importance of having assets
throughout childhood. The study also shows greater marginal asset effects for lowincome and low-wealth households. While confirming the importance of household
assets in child development for children with disabilities, the hypothesized mediation
mechanism, which argues household assets affect child well-being through changing
parent behaviors, is not supported.
The findings of this study have important policy implications and are
particularly useful for designing and testing asset-based policy innovations for
children with disabilities. It suggests that asset building should be included in the new
vision for successful development of children with disabilities. Asset accumulation
for children with disabilities should start early and last long with a specific focus on
health and health services. The minimum savings goal should be set at around
$10,000. Asset-based programs for children with disabilities should be progressive
toward those with low income and low wealth.
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Tables
Table 2.1 Effects of Asset Spending and Asset Holding for Children with Disabilities
Asset Effects Through

Areas of Family
Function

Economic Security

Access to Services and
Support

Investment in Child
Development

Psychological Well-being

Asset Spending

Asset Holding

Consumption smoothing in
economic crises

Help families better plan
for the future and avoid
economic hardship

Provide economic resources
for services of desired
quantity and quality

Availability of highquality services and
support through
homeownership

Positive physical
environment to stimulate
cognitive development and
provide opportunities for
high-quality education

School and neighborhood
environments indicated
by homeownership

Help create a sense of
control and greater life
satisfaction

Help develop future
orientation, self-esteem,
self-efficacy, and
positive self-image

Increase expectations for
children as well as
willingness to invest in
child investment

Table 3.1 Waves of the PSID and PSID-CDS Major Variables
Year

84

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

99

01

02

03

05

07

Child disability in the CDS files
×

×

×

Asset variables in the PSID family files
×

×

×

×

×

×

×

×

Outcome variables (health and education) in the CDS files
×

100

×

×

Table 3.2 Variables and Measures Used in the Study 23
Variables

Measurement

Range

Disability Variables
Ten health condition indicators

Dichotomous

0-1

WJ-R broad reading score
WJ-R applied problems test
Grade repeated (Yes/No)
School suspension/expulsion (Yes/No)
Global health status (Excellent/Otherwise)
School days missed due to physical illness
Number of hospitalizations
Number of doctor visits for illness

Continuous
Continuous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Count
Count
Count

0-200
0-200
1 or 0
1 or 0
1 or 0
0 - +∞
0 - +∞
0 - +∞

Doctor visits for emotional problems (Yes/No)

Dichotomous

1 or 0

Continuous
Ordinal
Continuous
Ordinal

-∞ - +∞
1, 2, 3, and 4
0 - +∞
1, 2, 3, and 4

Age
Gender (Male)
Race (Black and White)
Special education status (Yes/No)
Health insurance coverage

Continuous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Nominal

0-13
1 or 0
1 or 0
1 or 0
1,2, and 3

Disability types (10 indicators) (Yes/No)

Dichotomous

1-0

Dichotomous
Dichotomous
Continuous
Ordinal
Dichotomous

1 or 0
1 or 0
0-+∞
1, 2, 3, and 4
1 or 0

Dependent Variables

Independent Variables: Asset Variables
Amount of net worth
Four-level net worth
Amount of liquid assets
Four-level liquid assets
Control Variables 1: Child Characteristics

Control Variables 2: Parents’ Characteristics
Household header’s gender (Male)
Household header’s employment (Employed)
Mother’s age
Mother’s education
Mother’s marital status (Married)
Control Variables 3: Household Characteristics

23 The data sources listed in this table are particularly for childhood sample 1. For
childhood sample 2, data sources are slightly different. For example, disability
indicators and child outcome measures are from all three waves of the CDS. Asset
measures are from family files in 1994, 1999, and 2003.
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Variables
Household size
Number of children
Household income
Public program participation (Yes/No)
Region

Measurement

Range

Continuous
Continuous
Continuous
Dichotomous
Nominal

1-+∞
1-+∞
-∞ - +∞
1 or 0
1, 2, 3, and 4

Control Variables 4: Parenting Behaviors (Measured in the CDS)
Parental involvement
Educational Expectations
Parental warmth scale
Parenting stress

Continuous
Ordinal
Continuous
Continuous

7-27
1, 2, and 3
1-5
1-5

Table 4.1 Timing of Measures in Fixed-Effects Models

Child outcome measures
Child characteristics
Parenting behaviors
Asset measures
Household characteristics
Household head’s characteristics

Observation 1
(t=1)
1997 (CDS I)
1997 (CDS I)
1997 (CDS I)
1994
1994
1994
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Observation 2
(t=2)
2002 (CDS II)
2002 (CDS II)
2002 (CDS II)
1999
1999
1999

Observation 3
(t=3)
2007 (CDS III)
2007 (CDS III)
2007 (CDS III)
2003
2003
2003

Table 5.1 Result Comparison of the First and Second Sets of Analyses a

Asset Variables

Applied
Problems
Score

Educational Outcomes
Broad
Repeated
School
Reading
Grade
Suspension/
Score
Expulsion

Global
Health

Health Outcomes
School Hospitalization Doctor
Days
Visits for
Missed
Illness

Doctor
Visits for
Emotional
Problems

Panel I. The First Set of Analyses
Net Worth
Continuous
Categorical
Liquid Assets
Continuous
Categorical

+
-

+
-

-

-

+

-

-

-

+
+

-

-

-

Panel II. The Second Set of Analyses
Net Worth
Continuous
Categorical
+
Liquid Assets
Continuous
+
Categorical
+
a. Only significant results are marked in the table: “+” and “-” are used to indicate positive and negative associations, respectively.
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Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics (weighted, N=732 in each imputed dataset)
Variables
Dependent Variables (in 2002)
Applied problems score
Broad reading score
Repeated grade (yes)
School suspension or expulsion (yes)
Global health (excellent)
Number of school days missed
Number of hospitalization
Number of doctor visit for illness
Doctor visit for emotional problem (yes)
Asset Measures
Net worth
Percentage of negative net worth
Percentage of zero net worth
Log-transformed net worth
Categorical measure of net worth (%)
<$0
$0-$10,000
$10,001-$40,000
>$40,000
Liquid assets
Log-transformed liquid assets
Categorical measure of liquid assets (%)
=$0
$1-$1,000
$1,001-$10,000
>$10,000
Assets measured in:
1984
1989
1994
Control Variables a
Child’s characteristics (measured in 1997)
Age in 2002
Gender (male)
Race (Black)
Birth order to mother
Special education (yes)
Medical insurance in 2001
No insurance
Employer-provided or private insurance
Government-provided insurance
Disability in 1997

Mean or %
102.15
102.29
17%
17%
50%
3.37
.28
2.42
39%
$64,110
18%
5%
7.69
18%
28%
24%
30%
$21,243
6.43

SD

Median

17.82
19.71

101.01
100.64

4.55
1.12
4.20

2
0
1

$201,183

$12,400

4.50

9.42

$97,813
3.90

$1,600
7.38

3.40

12
Male
White
2
No
1

21%
25%
27%
27%
35%
43%
22%

11.69
60%
18%
1.97
28%
6%
71%
24%
57%
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Variables
Disability in 2002
Disability Types
Epileptic convulsion
Speech impairment
Hearing difficulty
Seeing difficulty or blindness
Emotional disturbance
Orthopedic impairment
Learning disability
Autism
ADD/ADHD
Household background
Head’s gender (male)
Head’s employment (employed)
Household size
Number of children
Food stamps (yes)
AFDC (yes)
SSI (yes)
Average income in previous five years
Log-transformed income
Mother’s marital status in 2001 (married)
Mother’s age in 2001
Mother’s education in 2001
Less than high school
High school
Some college
Four-year college and above
Mother’s reading score in 1997
Region in 1999
Northeast
North central
South
West
Mediators (measured in 1997)
Parental involvement
Parental warmth
Parenting stress
Educational expectations (%)
High school and below
Some college
Four-year college and above
a

Mean or %
78%

SD

Median
Learning disability

5%
15%
7%
11%
4%
13%
16%
2%
29%
81%
78%
3.40
1.31
21%
37%
31%
$29,139
9.91
67%
33.24

6.84

10%
35%
31%
24%
30.98

5.32

32
3

3.52
.53
.71

20.7
4.67
2.11
Four-year college

1.51
1.22

$25,686
.93

Male
Employed
3
1
No
No
No
$23,734
10.07
Married
34
Some College

19%
26%
39%
17%
19.97
4.53
2.15
23%
13%
64%

Unless specified in table, control variables are measured at the time when asset information is collected.
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Table 5.3 Net Worth and Educational Outcomes: Results of the First Strategy
Variables

Model
1

Model
2

Model
3

Model
4

Model
5

Model
1

Panel A: Applied Problems Scores (OLS)

Model
2

Model
3

Model
4

Model
5

Panel B: Broad Reading Scores (OLS)

Family Economic Resources
Log-transformed income
Log-transformed net worth
Categorical measure of net worth
(Reference group: $0-$10,000)
<$0

3.75**

3.83**

3.31**

-.03

3.44**

2.95*

-.05

1.80

1.80

1.24

-.0003

1.25

.69

-.03

3.11

3.30

2.54

3.02

$10,001-$40,000

.03

-.56

1.42

1.25

>$40,000

5.40*

5.17*

5.17**

5.06**

Parenting Behaviors
Parental involvement

.72**

.73**

.65**

.65**

Parenting warmth

-1.85

-1.95

-3.86**

-4.04**

Parenting stress
Educational expectations
(Reference group: High school or
below)
Some college

1.29

1.49

-.87

-.79

.48
5.59**
*

1.02
7.34**
*

1.53

.03
5.38**
Four-year college and above
*
Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1.
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7.49***

Variables

Model
1

Model
2

Model
3

Model
4

Model
5

Panel C: Repeated Grade (Probit)
Family Economic Resources

-.14

-.15

-.12

-.12

-.09

Model Model Model Model Model
1
2
3
4
5
Panel D: School Suspension or Expulsion
(Probit)
.19
.28
.24
.28*
.24

Log-transformed income
Log-transformed net worth
Categorical measure of net worth
(Ref. group: $0-$10,000)
<$0

.002

.003

-.03**

-.03**

-.25

-.28

.48**

.49**

$10,001-$40,000

.02

.03

.10

.15

>$40,000

-.46

-.47

-.05

.03

Parenting Behaviors
Parental involvement

-.03

-.03

-.10**

-.10**

Parenting warmth

.04

.06

-.15

-.17

Parenting stress
Educational expectations
(Ref. group: High school or
below)
Some college

.19

.18

.18

.18

.02

.0009

-.27

-.26

-.27

-.31

.14

.14

Four-year college and above

Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1.

107

Table 5.4 Liquid Assets and Educational Outcomes: Results of the First Strategy
Variables

Model
1

Model
2

Model
3

Model
4

Model
5

Model
1

Panel A: Applied Problems Scores (OLS)

Model
2

Model
3

Model
4

Model
5

Panel B: Broad Reading Scores (OLS)

Family Economic Resources
Log-transformed income
Homeownership (yes)
Log-transformed liquid assets
Categorical measure of liquid
assets
(Ref. group: =0)
$1-$1,000

3.75**

4.27**

4.01**

3.84**

3.64**

2.40

2.19

1.95

1.78

-.38

-.37

1.80

2.32

1.85

1.63

1.27

1.80

1.62

1.58

1.25

-.35

-.31

-5.94**

-5.53**

-7.48**

-6.65**

$1,001-$10,000

-6.15

-6.37

-5.56

-5.72

>$10,000

-4.03

-3.84

-3.40

-2.98

Parenting Behaviors
Parental involvement

.68**

.66**

.61*

.83**

Parenting warmth

-1.68

-1.78

-3.72**

-3.97**

Parenting stress
Educational expectations
(Ref. group: High school or
below)
Some college

1.24

1.41

-.90

-.03

.15

.33

1.14

3.00

5.50***

5.59***

7.43***

9.19***

Four-year college and above

Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1.
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Variables

Model
1

Model
2

Model
3

Model
4

Model
5

Panel C: Repeated Grade (Probit)

Model
1

Model
2

Model
3

Model
4

Model
5

Panel D: School Suspension or Expulsion (Probit)

Family Economic Resources
Log-transformed income
Homeownership
Log-transformed liquid assets
Categorical measure of liquid
assets
(Ref. group: =$0)
$1-$1,000

-.14

-.16

-.09

-.12

-.06

-.005

.04

-.005

.04

.007

.005

.19

.17

.20

.16

.19

-.26

-.23

-.24

-.21

.03

.03

.55**

.53**

.48*

.42*

$1,001-$10,000

.05

.06

.04

.06

>$10,000

-.16

-.20

.39

.42

Parenting Behaviors
Parental involvement

-.03

-.02

-.10**

-.09*

Parenting warmth

.04

.02

-.14

-.15

.20

.17

.19

.18

.03

.08

-.34

-.32

-.27

-.28

.10

.12

Parenting stress
Educational expectations
(Ref. group: High school or
below)
Some college
Four-year college and above

Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1.
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Table 5.5 Test Score Means by Educational Attainment

Test Score in 2002
Applied problems
score
Broad reading
score

Educational Attainment in 2007
Below
High school
College
high school
and above
enrollment
97.2
102.2
106.8
97.1

102.7

110

108.0

Table 5.6 Net Worth and Health Outcomes: Results of the First Strategy
Variables

Model
1

Model
2

Model
3

Model
4

Model
5

Panel A: Global Health (Probit)

Model
1

Model
2

Model
3

Model
4

Model
5

Panel B: School Days Missed (Negative Binomial)

Family Economic Resources
Log-transformed income
Log-transformed net worth
Categorical measure of net worth
(Reference group: $0-$10,000)
<$0

.19

.17

.13

.007

.17

.12

.007

-.09

-.06

.02

-.02**

-.04

.02

-.02**

.08

.09

.02

.004

$10,001-$40,000

.33*

.33*

-.35**

-.36**

>$40,000

.41**

.39**

-.56***

-.55***

Parenting Behaviors
Parental involvement

.02

.02

-.02

-.02

Parenting warmth

.02

.0002

.09

.12

Parenting stress
Educational expectations
(Reference group: High school or
below)
Some college

-.17

-.17

.13

.12

.002

.05

-.04

-.10

Four-year college and above

.06

.07

-.09

-.09

Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1.
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Variables

Model
1

Model
2

Model
3

Model
4

Model
5

Panel C: Hospitalization (Negative Binomial)

Model Model Model Model
Model
1
2
3
4
5
Panel D: Doctor Visits for Illness (Negative
Binomial)

Family Economic Resources
Log-transformed income
Log-transformed net worth
Categorical measure of net worth
(Ref. group: $0-$10,000)
<$0

-.24

-.15

-.09

-.04**

-.25

-.18

-.03*

-.02

-.02

.04

-.02**

-.03

.02

-.02**

.24

.09

.10

.05

$10,001-$40,000

-.43

-.47

-.28*

-.28*

>$40,000

-.79*

-.75*

-.51***

-.51***

Parenting Behaviors
Parental involvement

-.06

-.06

-.04*

-.04

Parenting warmth

.65**

.67**

.03

.05

Parenting stress
Educational expectations
(Ref. group: High school or
below)
Some college

.57*

.56*

.05

.04

.21

.18

-.07

-.13

.46

.44

.27

.25

Four-year college and above

Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1.
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Variables

Model Model Model Model Model
1
2
3
4
5
Panel E: Doctor Visits for Emotional Problems
(Probit)

Family Economic Resources
Log-transformed income
Log-transformed net worth
Categorical measure of net worth
(Ref. group: $0-$10,000)
<$0

.04

.05

.02

-.001

.07

.06

-.0006

.21

.22

$10,001-$40,000

.03

.03

>$40,000

.18

.21

Parenting Behaviors
Parental involvement

.005

.005

Parenting warmth

-.04

-.07

Parenting stress
Educational expectations
(Ref. group: High school or
below)
Some college

.25

.25

-.07

-.04

-.18

-.17

Four-year college and above

Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1.
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Model
1

Model
2

Model
3

Model
4

Model
5

Table 5.7 Liquid Assets and Health Outcomes: Results of the First Strategy
Variables

Model
1

Model
2

Model
3

Model
4

Model
5

Panel A: Global Health (Probit)

Model Model Model Model Model
1
2
3
4
5
Panel B: School Days Missed (Negative
Binomial)

Family Economic Resources
Log-transformed income

.19

.05

.09

.04

Homeownership

.02

.08

Log-transformed liquid assets
Categorical measure of liquid assets
(Reference group: $0)
$1-$1,000

.06***

.07

-.09

.06

.06

.08

.06

.03

-.30**

-.29**

-.30**

-.30**

.06***

-.05**

-.05**

.63***

.69***

-.02

-.06

$1,001-$10,000

.39*

.40*

-.25

-.25

>$10,000

.69***

.70***

-.42**

-.43*

Parenting Behaviors
Parental involvement

.02

.02

-.02

-.01

Parenting warmth

.003

-.01

.10

.09

Parenting stress
Educational expectations
(Reference group: High school or
below)
Some college

-.18

-.21

.15

.14

-.007

-.009

-.05

-.05

.06

.06

-.06

-.06

Four-year college and above

Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1.
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Variables

Model
1

Model
2

Model
3

Model
4

Model
5

Panel C: Hospitalization (Negative Binomial)

Model Model Model Model Model
1
2
3
4
5
Panel D: Doctor Visits for Illness (Negative
Binomial)

Family Economic Resources
Log-transformed income

-.24

-.28

.24

-.18

.11

Homeownership

.09

.07

.16

.15

Log-transformed liquid assets
Categorical measure of liquid assets
(Reference group: $0)
$1-$1,000

-.19***

-.19***

-.02

.14

.11

.13

.09

-.31**

-.32**

-.29**

-.32**

-.06***

-.06***

-.83**

-.76**

-.15

-.20*

$1,001-$10,000

-2.38***

-2.30***

-.37*

-.38*

>$10,000

-1.80***

-1.68***

-.44**

-.47**

Parenting Behaviors
Parental involvement

-.04

-.03

-.04

-.04

Parenting warmth

.68**

.66**

.07

.04

Parenting stress
Educational expectations
(Ref. group: High school or
below)
Some college

.62**

.60**

.08

.07

.21

.34

-.08

-.08

.44

.54

.28

.27

Four-year college and above

Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1.

115

Variables

Model Model
Model
Model
Model
1
2
3
4
5
Panel E: Doctor Visits for Emotional Problems
(Probit)

Family Economic Resources
Log-transformed income

.05

-.02

-.06

.005

-.03

Homeownership

-.009

-.04

-.03

-.07

Log-transformed liquid assets
Categorical measure of liquid assets
(Reference group: $0)
$1-$10,000

.03

.03

-.13

-.17

$10,001-$40,000

.16

.15

>$40,000

.42

.40

Parenting Behaviors
Parental involvement

.005

.001

Parenting warmth

-.06

-.05

Parenting stress
Educational expectations
(Ref. group: High school or below
Some college

.24**

.26**

-.08

-.08

Four-year college and above

-.19

-.18

Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1.
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Model
1

Model
2

Model
3

Model
4

Model
5

Table 5.8 Average Asset Effects on Educational Outcomes
After Propensity Score Classification

Asset Variables

Applied
Problems
Score
M2
M3

Panel I: Net Worth
Log-transformed
.02
Categorical
(ref: $0-$10,000)
<$0
$10,001-$40,000
Above $40,000
Panel II: Liquid
Assets
Log-transformed
-.25
Categorical (ref: $0)
$1-$10,000
$10,001-$40,000
Above $40,000
***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1

Educational Outcomes
Broad
Repeated
Reading
Grade
Score
M2
M3 M2 M3
.10

2.73
1.35
1.86

-.03

-2.15
-.26
.43

-.004
-4.61
-4.17
-3.54
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-.01

.17
-.06
-.17

-.04
-2.11
-1.57
-.68

School
Suspension/
Expulsion
M2 M3

.86
.54
.25

.01
.45
-.46
-.32

.48
.40
-.11

Table 5.9 Average Asset Effects on Health Outcomes After Propensity Score Classification

Asset Variables

Global Health
M2

Panel I: Net Worth
Log-transformed
Categorical
(ref: $0-$10,000)
<$0
$10,001-$40,000
Above $40,000
Panel II: Liquid Assets
Log-transformed
Categorical (ref: $0)
$1-$10,000
$10,001-$40,000
Above $40,000
***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1

M3

.007

M2

-.02

-.02

.11
.36
.57*
.08***

Health Outcomes
Hospitalization

School Days
Missed
M2
M3

-.23
-.40
-.99***
-.07***

.90***
.64***
1.18***

M3

-.02

.06
-.29
-.97***
-.13***

-.17
-.57**
-.65*

Doctor Visits for
Emotional Problems
M2
M3
-.005

.08
-.21
-.33
-.03

-.59
-1.49***
-1.24***
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Doctor Visits
for Illness
M2
M3

.08
-.36
.50
.03

.26
-.11
-.22

-.55
-.36
.32

Table 5.10 Average Asset Effects for Sub-groups by Expected Assets

Asset Variables

Global Health
M2

M3

Health Outcomes
School Days
Missed
M2

M3

Hospitalization
M2

M3

PANEL I: High Expected Assets Group
Liquid Assets
Log-transformed

.07

-.10

-.03

Categorical (ref: $0)
Above $10,000

.69

-.60

-.31

PANEL II: Low Expected Assets Group
Liquid Assets
Log-transformed

.12***

-.08

-.15***

Categorical (ref: $0)
Above $10,000

2.31***
-1.19
-1.77
M2=Model 2 with the continuous liquid asset measure; M3=Model 3 with the
categorical liquid asset measure. For categorical liquid asset measure, only the
regression coefficients for the highest liquid asset group (>$40,000) are reported.
***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1
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Table 6.1 Results Comparison of Fixed-Effects Models and SEM Analyses a
Educational Outcomes
Asset Variables

Applied
Problems
Score

Broad
Reading
Score

Repeated
Grade

Health Outcomes
School
Global School Hospitalization
Suspension/ Health Days
Expulsion
Missed

Doctor
Visits for
Illness

Doctor
Visits for
Emotional
Problems

Panel I. The Third Set of Analyses: Fixed-Effects Analyses
Net Worth
Continuous
Categorical
Liquid Assets
Continuous
Categorical

-

-

+
+

+

-

+
+

+
+

+

+

+
+

+/-

-

Panel II. The Fourth Set of Analyses: SEM Models
Net Worth
Continuous
+
Categorical
+
+
+
+
Liquid Assets
Continuous
+
+
+
+
+
Categorical
+
+
+
+
a. Only significant results are marked in the table: “+” and “-” are used to indicate positive and negative associations.
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+
+

+

Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics of Three-Wave PSID-CDS Data
Variables

Mean or
%

Dependent Variables
Applied problems score
Broad reading score
Repeated grade (yes)
children without repeating a grade in all 3 waves
children with repeating a grade in all 3 waves
School suspension or expulsion (yes)
children without school suspension in all 3 waves
children with school suspension in all 3 waves
Global health (=excellent)
children with excellent health in all 3 waves
children without excellent health in all 3 waves
Number of school days missed
children without school days missed in all 3 waves
Number of hospitalizations
children without hospitalization in all 3 waves
Number of doctor visits for illness
children without visits in all 3 waves
Doctor visits for emotional problem (yes)
children without visits in all 3 waves
children with visits in all 3 waves
Asset Measures
Net worth
Categorical measure of net worth
<$0
$0-$10,000
$10,001-$40,000
>$40,000
Liquid assets
Categorical measure of liquid assets
=$0
$1-$1,000
$1,001-$10,000
>$10,000
Control Variables a
Child’s characteristics
Age
Special education (yes)
Disability status (yes)
Household background
Head’s employment (employed)
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102.23
99.72
14%
62%
3%
14%
54%
.08%
47%
19%
28%
2.08
17%
.45
50%
2.57
6%
30%
48%
7%

SD

18.14
20.11

Median

102.00
99.00
0

0

0

3.76

0

1.55

0

4.03

2

$175,932

$1058,108 $30,500

13%
22%
20%
45%
$88,891

$942,056

$2,000

5.50

11
0
0

22%
21%
24%
32%

11.25
26%
49%
82%

1

Variables

Mean or
%

Household size
Number of children
Food stamps (yes)
AFDC (yes)
SSI (yes)
Average income
Mother’s marital status (married)
Mother’s age
Mother’s education
Less than high school
High school
Some college
Four-year college and above
Mediators
Parental involvement
Parental warmth
Parenting stress
Educational expectations
High school and below
Some college
Four-year college and above

4.02
2.09
17%
7%
6%
$61.696
68%
34.97

SD
1.11
.98

$72,200
7.73

Median
4
2
0
0
0
$46,486
1
35
Some college

13%
35%
29%
24%
5.17
4.03
2.35
26%
18%
55%
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3.06
.81
.83

5
4.14
2.29
4-year college

Table 6.3 Results of Fixed-Effects Models: Net Worth and Educational Outcomes
LM1
Log-NW
Categorical (Ref.: $0-$10,000)
<$0
$10,001-$40,000
>$40,000
Parental involvement
Parenting warmth
Parenting stress
Educational expectations
(Ref. group: High school or
below)
Some college
4-year college and above

.30**

LM2
LM3
LM1
LM2
Applied Problems Score
-.03
-.02
2.21
.03
4.44***

.04
.42
1.55

.32
-.13
-1.60***

.27
1.19
Repeated Grades
-.11***

Log-NW
-.05**
-.09***
Categorical (Ref.: $0-$10,000)
<$0
.18
1.48***
$10,001-$40,000
.18
.21*
**
>$40,000
-.79
-.49**
***
Parental involvement
-.25
Parenting warmth
-.34***
Parenting stress
.07
Educational expectations
(Ref.: High school or below)
Some college
-.34*
4-year college and above
-.36*
Regression coefficients are reported in the Table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1
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LM3

LM1

LM2

.28**

.08

.33
.62
1.85
.34
-.10
-1.63**

LM3
LM1
LM2
Broad Reading Score
.07
2.41
1.34
4.61***

-.03
1.01
1.52

-.12
-.87
.22

.24
1.07
-.03

1.08
3.13***
School Suspension/Expulsion
-.006 -.003

LM3

-.14
-.98
1.20
-.10
-.84
.24

1.09
3.13**

1.43***
-.10
-.69***
-.25***
-.29**
.05

-.08**
-.06
.12

-.26
-.60***
.19
-.07**
-.09
.12

-.58***
-.39*

-.21
-.32*

-.08
-.42**

-.27
-.67**
-.37

-.20
-.52***
.20

Table 6.4 Results of Fixed-Effects Models: Liquid Assets and Educational Outcomes
LM1
Log-LA
Categorical (Ref.: $0)
$1-$1,000
$1,001-$10,000
>$10,000
Homeownership
Parental involvement
Parenting warmth
Parenting stress
Educational expectations
(Ref.: High school or below)
Some college
4-year college and above
Log-LA
Categorical (Ref.: $0)
<$1-$1,000
$1,001-$10,000
>$10,000
Homeownership
Parental involvement
Parenting warmth
Parenting stress
Educational expectations
(Ref.: High school or below)
Some college
4-year college and above

.53***

2.68**

-.05**

-.31

LM2
LM3
LM1
LM2
Applied Problems Score
.04
.04

1.32

-.05***

-.44***

1.49
.33
-.13
-1.51**

-.02
1.21
5.28***
2.76**

-1.13
-.71
.68
1.27

.95
1.95
Repeated Grades
-.04*

-.88***
-.27***
-.40***
.07

.01
-.20
-.55
-.32

LM3

LM1
.78***

-1.30
-.62
.58
1.44
.32
-.25
-1.52**

-.16
-.23

-.54**
-.61***
.31
-1.03***
-.27***
-.47***
.06

-.03
-.22

Regression coefficients are reported in the Table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1
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.13

LM3
LM1
LM2
Broad Reading Score
.10
.14
.25
1.72
.23

.26

-.09***

1.61
3.64**
School Suspension/Expulsion
-.009 -.009

-.07

-.30*

.32
-.14
-.78
.12

3.12**
2.96**
7.40***
2.43

2.01

1.07
2.02

-.56***
-.61***
.20
-.56***

LM2

-.41**
-.09***
-.08
.11

-.22
-.34*

.-.62**
-.63**
-1.32***
-.08

-.27
.07
-.78***
-.27

LM3

-.17
-.03
1.47
.29
-.14
-.87
.13

1.66
3.68**

-.32*
-.02
-.75***
-.38**
-.09***
-.08
.07

-.26
-.30*

Table 6.5 Results of Fixed-Effects Models: Net Worth and Health Outcomes
LM1
Log-NW
Categorical (Ref: $0-$10,000)
<$0
$10,001-$40,000
>$40,000
Parental involvement
Parenting warmth
Parenting stress
Educational expectations
(Ref. : High school or below)
Some college
4-year college and above

.03*

Log-NW
Categorical (Ref: $0-$10,000)
<$0
$10,001-$40,000
>$40,000
Parental involvement
Parenting warmth
Parenting stress
Educational expectations
(Ref. : High school or below)
Some college
4-year college and above

-.05**

LM2
.03**

LM3
LM1 LM2
Global Health Status
.03**
.70***
.82***
.91***

.28**
.73***
.95***

.02**
-.27***
-.60***

-.04***

-.36**
.16
Hospitalization
-.04***
.53**
.21
-.15

LM3

LM1
-.01

.30**
.67***
.90***
.03**
-.26***
-.60***

-.02***

LM3
LM1 LM2
School Days Missed
-.03***

LM3

.51***
.29***
.40***

.51***
.20***
.32***
-.05***
-.27***
.08

.06
.15
.03
-.06**
-.28**
.09

-.37**
.12
-.02
.53***
.73***
.22**

LM2

-.19***
-.01
Doctor Visits for Illness
-.001
.000

-.03*
.32***
.06

.59***
.77***
.28
-.02
.29***
.04

-.002
.06
.19*

-.04
.09***
-.06*
.002
.05
.19***

-.60***
-.26***

-.67***
-.24***

-.11***
-.28*

-.11***
-.27**

Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1
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.22*
.08
-.08

-.19***
-.02

-.001
.10*
.-.05

LM1
Log-NW
Categorical (Ref: $0-$10,000)
<$0
$10,001-$40,000
>$40,000
Parental involvement
Parenting warmth
Parenting stress
Educational expectations
(Ref: High school or below)
Some college
4-year college/above

.01

LM2
LM3
LM1 LM2
LM3
Doctor Visits for Emotional Problems
.06***
.07***
.33
.32
.26

.07
.31***
.83***

-.13***
.23*
.54***

.01
.34***
1.13***
-.13***
.28**
.60***

-.37**
-.68***

-.30**
-.75***

Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1
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LM1

LM2

LM3

LM1

LM2

LM3

Table 6.6 Results of Fixed-Effects Models: Liquid Assets and Health Outcomes
LM1

LM2

Log-LA
Categorical (Ref: $0)
<$1-$1,000
$1,001-$10,000
>$10,000
Homeownership
Parental involvement
Parenting warmth
Parenting stress
Educational expectations
(Ref: High school or below)
Some college
4-year college and above

.05*

.06***

Log-LA
Categorical (Ref: $0)
<$1-$1,000
$1,001-$10,000
>$10,000
Homeownership
Parental involvement
Parenting warmth
Parenting stress
Educational expectations
(Ref. : High school or below)
Some college
4-year college and above

-.02

.03

-.11

.16

-.004

-.27**

LM3
LM1
LM2
Global Health Status
.05***

.31**
.03**
-.27***
-.61***

.28***
.56***
.70***
.14

.19
.36*
.57***
.04

-.39**
.14
Hospitalization
-.007

-.20**
-.03**
.31***
.06

.09
-.41*
-.02
-.10

LM3

.19*
.45***
.55***
.28**
.03**
-.28***
-.61***

LM1

LM2

.01

.03***

LM3 LM1
LM2
School Days Missed
.03***
.28**
.29**
.15
-.07

-.08

-.19**

.32***
.44***
.10**
-.17**

.31***
.36***
.06
-.15*
-.07***
-.27***
.04
-.24***
-.12*

.006

-.21***
-.11
Doctor Visits for Illness
.005
.005

-.40**
.12

-.08
-.08
.19*
-.26***

-.61***
-.30***

-.13
.-.08
.18
-.20**
-.03**
.33***
.07
-.58***
-.31***

Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1
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LM3

.11

.12**

-.17*
-.07***
-.29***
.04

.08*
-.002
.06
.19***
-.11***
-.27***

.16
.29**
-.01
.11

.06
.18*
-.19***
.15***

.10***
.17***
-.15**
.12**
-.003
.08**
.17***
-.12***
-.26***

LM1

Log-LA
Categorical (Ref: $0)
<$1-$1,000
$1,001-$10,000
>$10,000
Homeownership
Parental involvement
Parenting warmth
Parenting stress
Educational expectations
(Ref: High school or below)
Some college
4-year college and above

LM2
LM3
LM1
LM2
LM3
Doctor Visits for Emotional Problems
-.005 -.007 -.004

.06

.09

-.05
-.13***
.24**
.50***

.09
-.005
-.11
.08

-.28**
.05
-.48**
.11

-.45*
-.68**

-.25
.18
-.40
-.04
-.14***
.24*
.53***
-.35*
-.60***

Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1
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LM1

LM2

LM3

LM1

LM2

LM3

Net Worth

WI

Table 6.7 Net Worth and Child Outcomes in SEM Models
SEM1
SEM2
WII
WIII
WI
WII
Applied Problems Score
-.13
-.23
.25*
.18

Log-NW
Categorical
<$0
$10,001-$40,000
>$40,000

.04
.41
.97
.76

1.82
.18
.69

1.56
1.20
.88

Log-NW
Categorical
<$0
$10,001-$40,000
>$40,000

-.02

.001

.11

.09
.60
.83

2.50*
-.37
1.44

2.52
2.30
5.07*

Log-NW
Categorical
<$0
$10,001-$40,000
>$40,000

.01

.03

-.01

.04
.19
.06

-.15
.34*
-.99**

Log-NW
Categorical
<$0
$10,001-$40,000
>$40,000

-.008
-.12
-.17
-.06

WIII
.11

1.94
.72
3.42*
Broad Reading Score

2.07
.07
3.50**

1.70
1.47
2.98**

2.12
1.75
3.19
Repeated Grades
.01

2.70
-.50
3.07*

2.26
1.89
3.10**

.008

-.02

-.17
.27
-.21

.15
.17
.03

-.02

.15
.01
.17
.13
-.51
.03
School Suspension/Expulsion
.02
-.007

-.03**

.002

.09
-.01
-.06

-.07
.09
.02

.10
-.05
-.05

-.10
.13
.08

-.05
-.12
-.009
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Net Worth

SEM1
WII

WI

WIII

Log-NW
Categorical
<$0
$10,001-$40,000
>$40,000

.02

.02

.02

.07
.37**
.40**

.26
.11
.34

Log-NW
Categorical
<$0
$10,001-$40,000
>$40,000

.002

.003

.09
.16
.03

.23
.08
.27

.13
-.24
.04

Log-NW
Categorical
<$0
$10,001-$40,000
>$40,000

-.02

.01

-.03

.06
-.06
-.19

.15
.15
.05

Log-NW
Categorical
<$0
$10,001-$40,000
>$40,000

.02
-.03
-.08
.17

WI
Global Health
.02

SEM2
WII
-.02

.03
.17
.18
.02
.29**
.03
.13
.38***
.12
School Days Missed due to Physical Illness
.02
-.002
-.004
.12
.13
.02
Hospitalization
-.02

WIII
.003
.03
.02
-.02
-.009

.22
.08
.27*

.13
-.23
.04

.003

-.03*

.17
.12
.26

.27
.03
-.12

.02

.28
.06
.04
-.06
-.10
-.16
Doctor Visits for Physical Illness
-.006
.01

.004

-.01

.007
-.03
.09

.20
.17
.13

.02
.01
.04

.19
.15
.09

-.07
-.13
.13
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Net Worth

WI

SEM1
WII

WIII
WI
Doctor Visits for Emotional Problems
.05
.03*
.01

Log-NW
.04
.03
Categorical
<$0
-.07
-.08
-.04
$10,001-$40,000 .13
.31
-.15
>$40,000
.34
-.17
-.06
Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1
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-.03
.08
.37*

.08
.27
.25

SEM2
WII

WIII
-.001
-.03
-.13
-.03

Liquid Assets

WI

Table 6.8 Liquid Assets and Child Outcomes in SEM Models
SEM1
SEM2
WII
WIII
WI
WII
Applied Problems Score
-.06
-.27
.73***
.37**

Log-LA
Categorical
$1-$1,000
$1,001-$10,000
>$10,000

.14
1.48
2.53
3.55*

1.64
.16
2.02

1.06
1.56
1.28

Log-LA
Categorical
$1-$1,000
$1,001-$10,000
>$10,000

.06

.16

.06

-.23
1.12
2.10

1.87
.26
2.89*

.07
1.67
3.77

Log-LA
Categorical
$1-$1,000
$1,001-$10,000
>$10,000

.009

-.04

-.02

.32
-.003
.26

-.05
.006
-.27

Log-LA
Categorical
$1-$1,000
$1,001-$10,000
>$10,000

-.009
-.04
-.04
-.10

WIII
.20

3.79**
5.37***
7.41***
Broad Reading Score
.49***

1.59
.18
3.77**

1.75
2.34
2.58*

.53***

.12

2.77
2.97
5.67***
Repeated Grades
.001

3.19**
1.04
4.74***

.75
1.51
2.53*

-.03

-.02

-.06
-.007
-.22

.15
-.09
-.19

-.002

.16
.17
-.09
-.04
-.04
.08
School Suspension/Expulsion
.023
-.002

-.03

-.01

-.04
.08
-.27

-.04
.01
.07

-.02
.07
-.35*

-.07
.02
-.24

.13
.06
-.09
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Liquid Assets

SEM1
WII

WI

WIII

Log-LA
Categorical
$1-$1,000
$1,001-$10,000
>$10,000

.02

.04

-.12
.11
.14

-.08
.00
.37

Log-LA
Categorical
$1-$1,000
$1,001-$10,000
>$10,000

.01

.04*

.19
.18
-.07

-.01
.11
.32

.06
.07
-.25

Log-LA
Categorical
$1-$1,000
$1,001-$10,000
>$10,000

-.03*

.01

.01

.02
-.39**
-.08

.10
-.09
.16

Log-LA
Categorical
$1-$1,000
$1,001-$10,000
>$10,000

.03*
.45***
.17
.35*

WI
Global Health
.03**

.02

SEM2
WII
-.008

-.04
.02
-.08
.13
.18
-.11
.20
.25*
.03
School Days Missed due to Physical Illness
-.001
.01
.02*
.20
.19
-.04
Hospitalization
-.03*

WIII
.02
-.03
.11
.13
-.002

-.01
.11
.25

.06
.06
-.07

.01

.008

-.09
-.06
.02

.10
-.07
.03

-.002

.11
.005
-.07
-.37**
.09
-.09
Doctor Visits for Physical Illness
.008
.03**

.005

.01

.27**
.04
-.05

.11
-.01
-.04

.24*
.05
.05

.10
-.009
.12

.42***
.17
.33
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Liquid Assets

WI

SEM1
WII

WIII
WI
Doctor Visits for Emotional Problems
.02
.03
.02

Log-LA
.03
.001
Categorical
$1-$1,000
.38
.25
.16
$1,001-$10,000 .16
.35*
.03
>$10,000
.39
-.03
.16
Regression coefficients are reported in the table. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1
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.21
.08
.37

.19
.26
.16

SEM2
WII

WIII
-.01
.14
.03
-.05

Table 7.1 Results Summary of Four Sets of Analyses a

Asset
Types

Asset
Measures

Net
Worth
Liquid
Assets

Continuous
Categorical
Continuous
Categorical

Net
Worth
Liquid
Assets

Continuous
Categorical
Continuous
Categorical

Educational Outcomes
Applied
Broad
Repeated
School
Problems Reading
Grade
Suspension/
Score
Score
Expulsion

Health Outcomes
Global School Hospitalization Doctor
Health Days
Visits
Missed
for
Illness
I. The First Set of Analyses: Assets Measured before the Birth (Chapter 5)
+
+
+
+
+
II. The Second Set of Analyses: Propensity Score Classification (Chapter 5)

+
+
+
III. The Second Set of Analyses: Fixed-Effects Analyses (Chapter 6)
+
Net
Continuous
+
+
+
Worth
Categorical
Liquid
Continuous
+
+
Assets
Categorical
+
+
IV. The Fourth Set of Analyses: SEM Analyses (Chapter 6)
Net
Continuous
+
Worth
Categorical
+
+
+
+
Liquid
Continuous
+
+
+
+
Assets
Categorical
+
+
+
a. Only significant results are marked in the table: “+” and “-” are used to indicate positive and negative associations.
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Doctor
Visits for
Emotional
Problems

+

+
+

+/-

+
+

+
+

+

Table 7.2 Asset Effects on Global Health
st

Asset Measures

1 Set

nd

2 Set

4th Set:
SEM2 at WI

Net Worth
Log-transformed net worth

.007

.007

.02

Categorical measure of net worth
(Reference group: $0-$10,000)
<$0

.08

.11

.17

$10,001-$40,000

.33*

.36

.29**

>$40,000

.41**

.57*

.38***

Log-transformed liquid assets

.06***

.08***

.03**

Categorical measure of liquid assets
(Reference group: =$0)
$1-$1,000

.63***

.90***

.02

$1,001-$10,000

.39*

.64***

.18

>$10,000

.69***

1.18***

.25*

Liquid Assets

***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1
Table 7.3 Asset Effects on School Days Missed due to Physical Illness
4th Set:
2nd Set
Asset Measures
1st Set
SEM2 at WII
Net Worth
Log-transformed net worth

-.02**

-.02

-.004

Categorical measure of net worth
(Reference group: $0-$10,000)
<$0

.02

-.23

.22

$10,001-$40,000

-.35**

-.40

.08

>$40,000

-.56***

-.99***

.27*

Log-transformed liquid assets

-.30**

-.07***

.02*

Categorical measure of liquid assets
(Reference group: =$0)
$1-$1,000

-.02

-.17

-.01

$1,001-$10,000

-.25

-.57**

.11

>$10,000

-.42**

-.65*

.25

Liquid Assets

***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1
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Table7.4 Parenting Behavior Variables, Child Disability, and Child Outcomes
Educational Outcomes
Variables

Applied
Problems
Score

Broad
Reading
Score

Repeated
Grade

Health Outcomes
School
Suspension
/ Expulsion

Global
Health

School
Days
Missed

Hospitalization

Doctor
Visits for
Illness

Doctor
Visits for
Emotional
Problems

+**
+*
+

-*
+
+
-/+

+
+
-

+***
+***

+
+***

+
+**

Panel I. The First Set of Analyses: Assets Measured before Childbirth (Chapter 5)
Parenting Behavior Variables
Parental Involvement
Parenting warmth
Parenting stress
Educational expectations
Disability Variables
Having disability in WI
Having disability in WII
Parenting Behavior Variables
Parental Involvement
Parenting warmth
Parenting stress
Educational expectations
Disability Variables
Whether having a
disability in the observed
wave

+**
+
+***

+**
-**
***
+

-**
+
-/+

+
+
+/-

+
+
+

+
+
-

-***
+
+
-***
+
-*
+*
Panel II. The Third Set of Analyses: Fixed-effects Models (Chapter 6)

-***
+

+
+***

-***
-***
+
-*

-**
+
-**

+**
-***
-***
-**

-***
-***
+
***
-

-*
+***
+
***
-

+
+*
-***

-***
+*
+***
-***

-

+

+***

+***

-***

+***

+***

+***

+***

+
-

a. “+” and “-” are used to indicate positive and negative associations. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.1
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Figures
Figure 2.1 Asset Effects for Children: Linkages from Assets to Child Well-Being
Supportive Family Context
Parenting
Characteristics
Household
Assets

Family

Child

Functioning

Well-being

Home
Environment

Figure 2.2 Asset Effects for Children with Disabilities:
Linkages from Assets to Child Well-Being
Child
Disability

Supportive Family Context
Parenting
Behaviors
Household
Assets

Family

Child

Functioning

Well-being

Home
Environment
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Figure 3.1 Child Development Supplement (CDS) and Transition into Adulthood (TA)
in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
CDS-III (2007)
CDS-I (1997)

1,506 children

CDS-II (2002)

(10-19 years)
3,563 children

2,907 children
TA-II (2007)
1,115 young adults
TA-I (2005)
745 young
adults

Figure 4.1 Household Assets, Child Outcomes, and Confounding Factors

Confounding Factors:
Child

Socioeconomic

Unobserved

Status

Factors

(i.e. disability

(i.e., income &

(i.e., genetic

types)

education)

factors)

Characteristics

Program Services
(i.e., Medicaid, SSI)

Household Assets

Child Outcomes
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Figure 4.2 The First Empirical Strategy: Assets Measured Before Childbirth

Measured before
childbirth:

Measured in 1997:

Measured in 2002:

Assets
Household
Characteristics

Child
Outcome
Measures
Child
Characteristics

Parenting
Behaviors

Figure 4.3 Dynamic Model of Asset Effects in Structural Equations Modeling
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Figure 5.1 Net Worth and Predicted Applied Problems Score
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Figure 5.2 Liquid Assets and Predicted Applied Problems Score
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Figure 5.3 Liquid Assets and Predicted Probability of Repeating a Grade
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Figure 5.4 Net Worth and Predicted Probability of School Suspension or Expulsion
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Figure 5.5 Liquid Assets and Predicted Probability
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Figure 5.6 Net Worth and Predicted Probability of Excellent Health
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Figure 5.7 Liquid Assets and Predicted Probability of Excellent Health
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Figure 5.8 Net Worth and Predicted School Days Missed
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Figure 5.9 Liquid Assets and Predicted School Days Missed
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Figure 5.10 Net Worth and Predicted Frequency of Hospitalization
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Figure 5.11 Liquid Assets and Predicted Frequency of Hospitalization
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Figure 5.12 Net Worth and Predicted Doctor Visits for Illness
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Figure 5.13 Liquid Assets and Predicted Doctor Visits for Illness
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Figure 6.1 Net Worth and Predicted Number of School Days Missed
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Figure 6.2 Liquid Assets and Predicted Number of School Days Missed
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Figure 6.3 Net Worth and Predicted Frequency of Hospitalization
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Figure 7.1 Overestimation Risk of the Log-Transformed Asset Measure
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Figure A.1 Procedures of Propensity Score Classification
For each imputed dataset:

STEP 1:

STEP 2:
Propensity
score
estimation
for net worth

STEP 3:
Create three
groups of
each size

STEP 4:
Estimate
asset effects
for each
group

STEP 5:
Combine
results
across three
groups

STEP 2:
Propensity
score
estimation
for liquid
assets

STEP 3:
Create three
groups of
equal size

STEP 4:
Estimate
asset effects
for each
group

STEP 5:
Combine
results
across three
groups

Select
predictor
variables

STEP 6: Repeat the above steps ten times for all imputed datasets: Ten sets of
results are obtained.

STEP 7: The Rubin rules are applied to combine the ten sets of results into one to
show asset effects.
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Figure A.2 Balance Check Before and After Propensity Score Classification

Figure B.1 Fixed-Effects Analysis in the Context of SEM
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Figure B.2 Dynamic Model of Asset Effects in SEM
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Appendix A. Procedure for Propensity Score Classification
To control for the potential confoundedness of assets and household
background variables, the second set of analyses uses propensity score classification
before regression analyses (Imai & Van Dyk, 2004). First, households’ net worth and
liquid asset values are predicted from household background predictors, and the
predicted values are used as the propensity scores of net worth and liquid assets. Then
the study sample is categorized into three equal groups 24 based on the ranking of the
estimated propensity score of household assets. Each group is about one-third of the
sample. One group includes observations with the predicted asset value (net worth or
liquid assets) in the top 33%, one group has the bottom 33%, and the middle 33%
forms the third group. Regression models tested in the previous chapter are re-tested
for the three groups separately. Finally, results for each group are combined as the
average asset effects for the entire sample.
Since observations within each group are relatively homogenous in terms of
household backgrounds (as reflected by similar propensity scores within each group)
while observations across groups are relatively heterogeneous, this approach can
better control for confounding relationships between household assets and other
household background variables. This strategy is useful especially when there are
multiple confounding relationships that are not linear and additive.
Procedure for Propensity Score Classification
The procedure of propensity score classification includes several steps. Figure
A.1 briefly describes the procedure of propensity score analyses. First, indicators of
household background are selected to estimate the propensity score of household
assets. These indicators are characteristics of household heads (age, gender,

24 I tested four, five, six, and ten groups in sensitivity tests.
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employment status, and educational attainment), household size, number of children,
participation in public programs (Food Stamp, SSI, or AFDC), and the average
household income in the previous five years. All these variables are measured in the
same time period as asset measures. 25 As expected, some household background
variables, such as income, education, and household heads’ age, are highly related to
household assets. Ideally, those variables measured later than asset variables should
not be used to predict the propensity score of household assets because they might be
the consequence of holding assets.
FIGURE A.1 ABOUT HERE

Second, the generalized boosted regression model is used to predict net worth
and liquid assets, respectively. As a data mining technique having considerable
success in predictive accuracy, the generalized boosted regression model is better to
balance household background variables for those with different levels of assets. 26
Third, based on the ranking of the estimated propensity score from the boosted
regression, observations are categorized into three groups with equal size. Fourth,
Models 2 and 3 in the first set of analyses (with the continuous and categorical asset
measures, respectively—see Chapter 5 for details) are conducted in each group for all

25

Three criteria are used to select variables for predicting household assets: (1)
Variables are measured no later than asset measures; (2) Variables are controlled for
in the first set of analyses; and (3) Variables are likely to affect household asset
accumulation.

26

In fact, three models are used to estimate the propensity score of net worth and
liquid assets. Model 1 (PSM 1) is a multivariate OLS regression simply including all
variables mentioned above as independent variables to predict net worth and liquid
assets. Since both net worth and liquid assets are highly skewed, Model 2 (PSM 2)
applies skew-normal linear regression to predict net worth and liquid assets. Model 3
(PSM 3) conducts the generalized boosted regression to predict propensity scores of
net worth and liquid assets. This chapter only reports results from the generalized
boosted regression.
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outcome measures. Fifth, the estimated asset effects for each group then are combined
across the three groups using the method proposed by Imai and Van Dyk (2004). For
example, suppose the estimated coefficients of assets for the three groups are

β g , g = 1, 2, and 3 with standard errors sg . Asset effects estimated within each group
( β g ) can be considered asset effects for a sub-sample (high, medium, and low
expected assets). The average asset effects for the sample, then, is the mean of

β g s with the standard error of

(∑ sg 2 ) / 32 . These steps are repeated for each of the

ten imputed datasets. The results are further combined across the ten imputed datasets
using the Rubin rule. For example, each imputed dataset m (m=1….10) has the
average asset effects β g m . According to the Rubin rule (1987), the mean of these ten

β g m s is the average asset effects across ten imputed datasets. Taking into account
both within- and between-imputation variation, calculation of the standard error is
more complex, and the formula can be referred to Rubin (1987).
Balance Check before and after Propensity Score Classification
To check whether propensity score classification successfully addresses the
“observed” selection bias, I examine the relationships between household assets and
household background variables before and after propensity score classification. If the
significant associations between these variables disappear after classification, then
one can say the selection bias is successfully addressed.
Using the net worth measure as an example, this section shows the
correlations between net worth and these background variables before and after
propensity score classification. To do this, the ten background variables are regressed
as dependent variables on net worth before classification. This produces ten single
regression models. The background variables are characteristics of household heads
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(age, gender, education, and employment status), household size, number of children,
program participation (in food stamps, SSI, or AFDC), and the average household
income in the previous five years. Depending on the measurement level of each
variable, one of the following is used: OLS regression, Probit regression, and ordinal
logistic regression.
FIGURE A.2 ABOUT HERE

The obtained p value of the net worth variable in each of these regression
models is plotted in Figure A.2. The dotted line depicts the relationships between net
worth and household background variables before propensity score classification, and
the two solid lines are drawn at p=.05 and p=.1. Data points falling below these two
solid lines show significant associations between net worth and background variables.
The p value of net worth in five regressions is smaller than .05; the dependent
variables of these five regressions are household head’s age, gender, employment,
household’s participation status in the food stamp program, and household income.
The p value of net worth in the regression of household head’s education is smaller
than .1. In other words, before propensity score classification, household assets are
highly correlated with most of the household background variables, and the estimated
asset effects in the first set of analyses are likely confounded with these variables. It is
interesting to find that net worth is not strongly associated with participation in AFDC
and SSI, the two means tested programs. Three reasons may explain this: First, for
about 60% of observations, asset information was collected in 1984 or 1989, when
asset limits of AFDC and SSI were not so restricted as they are today; the median
liquid assets for the sample is $1,600. Second, net worth includes home equity, which
does not count against program eligibility. Third, the original scale of net worth,
which is highly skewed, may affect regression estimation.
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The dash-dot line in Figure A.2 plots the p value of net worth in the same
regression after propensity score classification. To obtain these p values, the
procedure in Figure A.1 is performed with slight modification. Rather than estimates
asset effects, Step 4 regresses household background variables on net worth alone.
The dash-dot line in Figure A.2 suggests that the smallest p value of net worth is
nearly .3 greater than the cutoff threshold of .1. None of these household background
variables is statistically correlated with household assets. After propensity score
classification, the distribution of net worth is balanced across these household
background variables. Therefore, it can be said with more confidence that after
classification, the estimated asset effects are not likely to be caused by the
associations between assets and these background variables.
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Appendix B. Model Specification of SEM Analyses

The fourth empirical strategy tests asset effects on educational and health
outcomes for children with disabilities using the three-wave longitudinal data in
Structural Equations Models (SEMs). A main technical feature of this strategy is that
it allows the correlation between household assets and the residual in the previous
stages to be specified and estimated. As a possible solution to the endogeneity issue in
fixed-effects analyses (discussed in Chapter 4), it may better capture the dynamic
relationships between household assets and child outcomes (See Equations 4.13).
FIGURE B.1 ABOUT HERE

The analyses are conducted on the same sample used for fixed-effects analyses,
and two models are tested for each outcome measure. The first model (SEM1) adds an
individual heterogeneous term (similar to fixed-effects analyses), and correlates
household assets with the error term of dependent variables at the previous stage. In
other words, SEM1 assigns a structure—current assets associated with the error term
of outcome measures at the previous stage—to model the potential endogeneity of
assets in fixed-effects analyses. In addition, SEM1 allows varying asset effects at
different observation points. Figure B.1 illustrates this specification without including
control variables. Latent variable

α refers to the individual heterogeneous term, and

bt+1 and bt+2 are estimated correlations between household assets and the error terms
of outcome measures at the previous stage. β is estimated asset effects on the
outcome measure at different points in time. While intended to resemble the idea of
fixed-effects analyses, it uses the maximum likelihood estimator instead of the fixedeffects estimator. Another difference is that, for this strategy, the unit of analysis is
the child and the sample size becomes smaller (therefore the power of the analyses is
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also smaller). Finally, since SEM models are not conditional models, it can include all
children in the analysis, including those without person-variation on outcome
measures over time. Figure B.1 can also be expressed in the following equations (B.1):

Yit = α i + βt Ait + ε it
Yit +1 = α i + βt +1 Ait +1 + ε it +1
Yit +2 = α i + βt + 2 Ait +2 + ε it +2
bt +1 = Corr ( At +1,ε t )

bt + 2 = Corr ( At + 2,ε t +1)
The second model specification (SEM2) does not have the individual
heterogeneous term in analyses. Instead, SEM2 assumes a dynamic relationship
between children’s outcomes over time and includes the first-order lag of the
dependent variable in analyses. SEM2 still allows household assets to be correlated
with the error term of outcome measures from the previous stage. Equations 4.12
suggest that the cumulative assets effects up until this stage can be replaced with the
first-order lag of the dependent variable. SEM2 can be considered an empirical
strategy reflecting this idea. Equations B.2 and Figure B.2 show the specification of
SEM2 without control variables.
FIGURE B.2 ABOUT HERE

SEM1 and SEM2 include the same control variables as fixed-effects analyses.
All count dependent variables (i.e., school days missed, hospitalization, and doctor
visits for illness) are recoded into dichotomous measures, and Probit instead of
Poisson regression is applied to these outcome measures. Given that the error term is
the key for this strategy, and that Poisson regression for count variables do not allow
the error term to be estimated, it is not appropriate for this strategy. Main findings are
briefly discussed because these analyses are a further exploration based on fixed-
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effects analyses.

Yit = βt Ait + ε it
Yit +1 = βt +1 Ait +1 + δ t +1Yt + ε it +1
Yit +2 = βt +1 Ait +2 + δ t + 2Yt +1 + ε it +2
bt +1 = Corr ( At +1,ε t )

bt + 2 = Corr ( At + 2,ε t +1)
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